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(a) State ex rel. Board of Univer­
sity and School Lands v,
McMillan............... Ik
Key 16. School f u n d s ...............  15
No cases in North Dakota
Key 17. Creation and s o u r c e s .......  15
(a) State v. Stockwell (see post
Key i4-7)............... 15
Key 18. Investment and administration . . .  15
(a) State v. McMillan (see ante
Key 1 5 ) ............... 15
(b) State ex rel. Board of Univer­
sity and School Lands v, Hanson 15
(c) State V. Divide County . . . .  l5
(d) Moses V. Baker......... 16
Key 19. Apportionment and disposition . . .  16
No cases in North Dakota
Key 20. Regulation and supervision of schools
and educational institutions in 
general..................... 16
(a) Todd V. Board of Education of
City of Williston....  16
( b) Gerhardt v. Heid (see ante
Key 2 ) ................. 18
IV. CREATION, ALTERATION, EXISTENCE, AND DISSOLU­
TION OF DISTRICTS..........................  I9
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
IV
CHAPTER p a g e
Key 21, Nature and status as corporations . 19
No cases in North Dakota
Key 22. Constitutional and statutory pro­
visions ......................... 19
(a) School District No. 9i|. v. King 19
(b) Kosten v. Board of Education
of Village of Wild Rose . . .  20
(c) Loucks V. Phelps............  21
(d) Jones v. Brightwood Independ­
ent School District No. 1 . . 22
Key 2 3 . Creation and organization......... 23
No cases in North Dakota
Key 2l|. (1). In g e n e r a l ...................  23
No cases in North Dakota
Key 2l|. (2). Attacking legality of organiza­
tion .............................  23
(a) Weiderholt v. Lisbon Special 
School Dist. No. 1 9 ........  23
(b) Billings School District v.
Loma Special School District , 2ij.
Key 2 5 . Independent and other districts in
incorporated cities, towns, and 
v i l l a g e s .........................  25
(a) Billings School District v.
Loma Special School District
(see ante Key 21̂. (2 )) . . . .  25
Key 26. Rural independent districts and
other special organizations , . . . 25
No cases in North Dakota
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
V
CHAPTER PAGE
Key 2 7. Proceedings for organization . . .  26
No cases in North Dakota
Key 28. De facto districts............... 26
(a) State v. Ferguson . . . . . .  26
Key 2 9. Unorganized territory............  26
No cases in North Dakota
Key 3 0. Territorial extent and boundaries . 26
(a) Weeks v. Het land............  26
Key 31. Alteration and creation of new
districts Csee.ante Key 2 2) . . . .  27
Key 3 2. Change of boundaries............. 27
(a) School District No. v.
Thompson....................  27
(b) Weiderholt v. Lisbon Special 
School District No, 19 (see
ante Key 2ij. ( 2 ) ) ............  28
(c) Loucks V. Phelps (see ante Key
2 2) .  ....................  28
Key 3 3. Consolidation and union districts . 29
Proceedings for consolidation (see 
post Key 3 7 ) ....................  29
Review of proceedings (see post Key 
3 9 ) ..............................  29
Key 34» D i v i s i o n ........................  29
(a) Plummer v. B o r s h e i m........  29
(b) TalImadge v. Walker . . . . .  30
Key 3 5. Change of organization to or from
independent district . ; ........  30
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
VI
CHAPTER
Key 3 6.
Key
Key
(a) State ex rel, v. Gang . . .
Powers of boards or officers, and 
of courts .......................
(a) Bloomington School District 
No. 17 V, Larson ........
Key 37. Proceedings in general 
No cases in North Dakota
37 (2). Meetings and mode of action in 
general....... ..................
( a 
(b
37 (3). 
( a
(b
( c
(d
( e 
(f
McDonald v. Hanson . 
Anderson v. Peterson 
Petition or consent .
School District No. 9l|- v . 
Thompson (see ante Key 32) . .
TalImadge v. Weber (see ante 
Key 314- ) .....................
McDonald v. Hanson ( see ante 
Key 37 (2)) ...............
Rosten v. Board of Education 
of Village of Wild Rose (see 
ante Key 22) ...............
State V, Stevens 
State V. Laman ,
Key 37 (!+). Notice
Key
(a) School District No, 9i|. v. 
Thompson (see ante Key 32)
37 (5). Kecords, orders and reports . .
No cases in North Dakota
PAGE
30
31
31
32
32
32
3k
36
36
37
37
38 
38
38
39
39
39
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
v i  i
CHAPTER PAGE
Key 3 8 , Submission of question to popular
vot  ............................  4 0
(a) Iverson v, Williams School
District (see post Key 6 8 ) . . IfO
Key 39. Review of proceedings . . . . . . .  k-0
(a) State v, Thursby-Butte Special 
School District No. 37,
McHenry County............ . U-0
(b) State V. Strauss............. L|.0
Key i|.0. Operation and e f f e c t ............. 1̂ 0
(a) State v. Gang (see ante Key 35) li-0
(b) Farley v. Lawton School Dis­
trict No. I|.l..........  1̂1
Key 1̂ 1. Adjustment of pre-existing rights
and liabilities................. . 1|2
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCriCK
Statement of orobiem. The pnrpoee of this study w s  
to present under one cover briefs of the Supreme Court.de­
cisions affecting school law in the State of North Dakota, 
and to point out the principles and trends underlying these 
decisions.
Importance of study. As a result of this study 
school administrators, teachers* school boards and other 
Interested persons may become acquainted with litigation 
pursuant to the organisation* administration^ and conduct 
of schools and school districts in this state.
By statements of general and specific principles* 
and quotations from illustrative, statutes and court deci­
sions* this presentation may also be used as source material 
in a North Dakota school law and school history course.
Limitations of the study. Because they set the 
precedents which JTorm one of the foundations of school law* 
only cases that were appealed to North Dakota Supreme Court 
were considered. These cases include litigation arising 
from territorial years* 1879* through 1953.
*
Method of presentation and sources. The cases are 
briefed in the language of the law court ; but where legal
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might h#ve th# ImymmA, th«lr employment has
been circemvemted# wherever poeslble» hy translating them 
Intm common terminelegy» Also the eases were abstracted 
with appropriate citations Streeting the reader to further 
Investigation of the entire case. The citation consists of 
the names of the litigants» the volume and page number of 
the source, and the date of the Supreme Court's decision. 
Following the citation are the essential facts of the case, 
then the rule of law or holding and opinion of the court.
In every case, the authority of the court was recog-* 
nised as the final adjudicator. The abstract front each case 
was prepared without any interpolation or personal views to 
alter or change the facts and the rule established by the 
law court.
It is not possible, nor is it expedient, in a project 
of this kind, wherein abstracts are presented, to set forth 
all the facts peculiar to each of the reported cases; but 
the core fact or facts that led to the action at law are 
stated. Some of the abstracts are considerably long, while 
others are markedly brief. The length of abstracts depended 
upon a variety of factors: volume of facts and evidence,
narrowness or breadth of application to school law, signifi­
cance of action, and number of rules and/or holdings in each 
litigat ion.
The cases comprising this thesis appear in the North
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Dakota Report* and tka M o r t h w a t a m  Reporter (see bibliog­
raphy) ; Eaek of these soarcea is cited by volame aad page 
namber after the mame-ideatificatiom of the appropriate case.
North Dakota Reports contains the cases tried before 
the Sapreme Court of North Dakota; the Northwestern Reporter 
contains all cases tried before Supreme Courts in seven 
statest North Dakota included.
The Northwestern Reporter series employs the Key 
system reporting device originated by the West Publishing 
Company. The system facilitates reference to similar cases 
in other states because the identical Key number, pointing 
to specific topical headings in all points of law, is used 
by regional reporters throughout the United States. For 
example. Key 13, under the general topic of Schools and 
School Districts, treats of separate schools for colored 
pupils. No actions relative to this problem have been taken 
into North Dakota courts, but cases In point may be discov­
ered in other states under the Key 13 nastber.
Because of the universality of the Key system of 
reporting cases at law, that method of organisation and 
reference was used in this thesis. State reports are not 
based upon the Key system, but all regional reporters are; 
however, the cases In both series reporters, state and,re­
gional, are presented with only minor changes in editing; 
no revisions are made in the facts and rules involved.
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In order to be consistent vltb the broad organisation 
of this thesis, the Key system is employed at the outset to 
formulate the Table of Contents. General headings are fol­
lowed by Key topics, which in turn have the pertinent cases 
listed under them.
The cases are presented under a system of cross- 
referencing iriilch, %Aere more than one ruling prevails in a 
given case, re-cites the case in another appropriate Key 
area, with a statement of the rule pertaining to that par­
ticular Key topic. This procedure creates the following ad­
vantages : (1) It facilitates content research, (2) it
places the rules, laws, and holdings into their appropriate 
school law areas, and (3) it eliminates unwieldiness and 
confusion in the employment of the thesis.
The thesis is divided into eleven chapters.
Chapter 1. Introduction.
Chapter II. Private Schools and Academies.
Chapter 111. Establishment, School Lands, Funds,
and Regulations In General.
Chapter IV. Creation, Alteration, Existence, and
Dissolution of Districts.
Chapter V, Government, Officers, and District
Meetings.
Chapter VI. District Property, Contracts and
Liabilities.
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Chapter VII. District Debts; Securities and
Taxation.
Chapter VIII. Claims Against Districts, and Actions.
Chapter IX. Teachers.
Chapter X. Pupils and Conduct and Discipline of
Schools.
Chapter XI. Summary and Conclusions.
Bibliography.
The phrase, "No cases in North Dakota," which appears 
at times in the table of contents and within the body of the 
thesis, means that no cases within a given area of school 
litigation have been reviewed by the North Dakota Supreme 
Court.
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CHAPTER 11 
PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIES
Key I. EstablishaeRt and status In general.
No cases in North Dakota.
' Key 2. Incorporation and organisation.
(a) Gerhardt v. Held. ( 1936) 26? N. W. 12?
(66 N. D. i|i*4)
This is an action by the plaintiffs; as electors and 
taxpayers of a school district, against the directors and 
other officers of the school district, and four teachers in 
the schools in the district.
FACTS ; During the term opening In September, 193$, 
six teachers were employed in the Gladstone consolidated 
school (Stark County); four of these teachers were nuns, 
members of the Sisterhood of St. Benedict. There %fas no 
claim and no evidence that any religious instruction or 
religious exercises were conducted.
The evidence is to the effect that the four teachers 
in question wore the habit of the Sisterhood and that they 
turned part of their earnings over to the Sisterhood of St. 
Benedict.
The object of this action was to restrain the teach­
ers from wearing what is denominated "a religious garb or 
dress* while engaged in teaching a public school.
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QUESTION ; Whether the fact that the teachers con­
tribute to the Sisterhood a large part of their earnings and 
wear their particular garb during school hours constitutes a 
violation of the Constitution and laws of North Dakota and 
infringes the rights of the plaintiffs so as to entitle them 
to injunctive relief.
HOLDING; The laws of the state do not prescribe the 
fashion of dress of the teachers in our schools.
The fact that the teachers contributed a share of 
their earnings to the religious order of which they are mem­
bers is not violative of the Constitution. A person in the 
employ of the state or any of its subdivisions is not in­
hibited from contributing money, which he or she has earned 
by service so performed, for the support of s(me religious 
body of which he or she is a member. To deny the right to 
make such contribution constitutes a denial of that right of 
religious liberty %diich the Constitution guarantees.
DECISICN: Judgment for the defendants.
Public school held not made "sectarian school" merely 
because teachers wear habit of religious order while engaged 
in teaching and contribute portion of their earnings to 
Sisterhood or order.
Key 3-7. No cases in North Dakota.
Key 8, Pupils, tuition, and discipline.
(a) Rule V, Connealy. (1931) 237 N. W. 197
•
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(61 N, D. 57)
(This case is not pertinent to a study of schools and 
school districts, having to do primarily with principles 
pertaining to notes, contracts, performance, involved in a 
privately solicited correspondence course.)
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CHAPTER 111
ESTABLISHMENT9 SCHCX3L LANDS AND FUNDS,
AND REGULATIONS IN GENERAL
K#v 9. Power to establish and maintain in general.
No cases in North Dakota*
Key 10. Constitutional and statutory provisions.
(a) State ex rel Sathre v. Board of 
University and School Lands of North Dakota* ( 1935) 
262 N. W. 60 (65 N. D. 68?)
Action by the State, on the relation of P. O. Sathre, 
Attorney General, against the Board of University and School 
Lands of North Dakota, and another, to enjoin defendants Orm 
exercising certain authority conferred on the board by Sen­
ate Bill No. 26, Laws 1935* From an order sustaining a 
general demurrer to the complaint, plaintiff appeals. Order 
confirmed.
FACTS; It was alleged in the complaint that applica­
tions were presented to the Board of University and School 
Lands asking it to reduce and scale down accrued and delin­
quent interest on certain real estate mortgages, and that 
said board was about to and would "accept from debtors of 
mortgages securing the payments of Investments of permanent 
school funds in this state less than the interest In full 
accrued thereon."
#
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QUESTION; Bill No. 26, Laws 1935 (chapter 2$5) is 
entitled: "An act to provide for the scaling down and dis­
counting of past due interest on loans made by the Board of 
University and School Lands.”
The sole question is concerned only with whether the 
Board of University and School Lands in any case may exer­
cise the power which said Senate Bill No. 26 purports to 
confer upon said board. Is Senate Bill No. 26 constitu- 
t i ona17
RULE: The members of the court agreed that the deci­
sion falls within and is controlled by section 89 of the 
State Constitution, as amended, which provides "that in no 
case shall any legislative enactment or law of the State of 
North Dakota be declared unconstitutional unless at least 
four of the Judges (of the Supreme Court) shall so decide”; 
and that, consequently, it is the duty of this court to hold 
that the statute does not contravene any of the provisions 
of the State Constitution invoked by the plaintiff.
DECISION; Court of Judges holds that Senate Bill No. 
26, La%#s 1935* is not vulnerable to any of the attacks made 
against it in this action; and that consequently the trial 
court was correct in sustaining the demurrer. The order 
appealed from is affirmed.
Key 11. School system, and establishment or discon­
tinuance of schools and local educational institutions in 
general.
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(a) State v. Valiev City Special School 
District, ( 1919) 173 N. W. 750, kZ N. D. 14.614.,
Action brenght by the State of North Dakota against 
what la termed the Valley ^Ity special school district, to 
recover $2,7914-* with Interest, and the cost of this action.
FACTS: There Is located at Valley City a State Nor­
mal School, known as the Valley City Normal School; In con­
nection therewith and as a part thereof Is operated a model 
high, grade, and elementary school, wherein Instrnctlon Is 
given to the pupils who attend by the faculty and student 
body of the State Normal School. The State Normal School Is 
located In the Valley City special school district of Valley 
City, The pupils who attend the model school reside within 
the Valley City special school district.
The state seeks to recover the amount mentioned In 
the complaint for the attendance of the number of pupils 
for the time stated as set forth In the complaint.
The defendant claims that the Normal Schools of the 
state are not part of the public school system.
QUESTION : Was It within the power of the legislature
to Impose on the Valley City special school district a rea­
sonable charge for the Instruction and educational facili­
ties afforded such pupils by the Normal School through itjs 
model high school? Is the Normal School a part of the free 
public school system of North Dakota?
•
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RULE; Chapter 142 of the Session Laws of 1915 reads 
thus : "That all students attending any model high, graded,
or elementary school vrttlch Is operated, maintained or in any 
other manner connected with the State University, any Normal 
School, or any other publicly maintained educational insti­
tution of higher learning in this state in which model high, 
graded, or elementary school, members of the faculty or stu­
dent body of such University, Normal School, or institution 
of higher learning, teach, there shall be paid by the school 
district in which said pupils reside to said Institution as 
tuition for such attendance (amount per month stated),.,," 
That the Normal School is part of the free public 
school system of North Dakota is set forth in section 148 
of the State Constitution.
DECISION ; Plaint iff*s complaint states good cause of
action.
( b) Batty V . Board of Educat ion of City of 
Wi lliston. ( 1936) 269 N. W. 49 (6? N. D, 6)
From an order sustaining a demurrer to the defend­
ant’s answer, the defendants appeal, Action for an injunc­
tion by J , H, Batty,
FACTS : The board of education of the city of Willis-
ton is a special school district.,.which in 1931 adopted a 
resolution providing that...all high school students who are 
residents of Wi H i  ston Special School District No, 1 will be
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required te pay $7*50 for each half unit of credit, after 
four full yea rsT at tendance of high school. .«(There are ex­
ceptions stated uhich are not material and pertinent in the* 
instant case and therefore need not be stated.)
Plaintiff's son attended high school for a period of 
four full years, but did not complete the course of study 
requirements for graduation. Defendants in their answer 
allege that this failure was because of idleness and in­
dolence on his part. Thereafter he sought to continue as a 
student in the hig|h school, but the defendants, enforcing 
the regulation above set forth, refused him permission to do 
so unless and until the tuition charge should be paid. 
Thereupon the plaintiff began the action.
The defendants on this appeal insist that the regula­
tion is in the interest of discipline, and that the board 
was clothed with the authority to make and enforce the regu­
lation in question pursuant to section 12^1, Comp. Laws 1913, 
which provides, among other things, that:
"Each board of education shall have the power and it
shall be its dutyt ....
"11. To adopt, alter and repeal, whenever it may 
deem expedient, rules and regulations for the reception, 
organization, grading, government and instruction of pupils, 
their expulsion, suspension or transfer from one school to 
another..."
e#
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RULE; The public schools••«shall be at all times 
equally free, open and accessible to pupils of school age 
residing within the district.
DECISION: Affirmed for plaintiff.
Key 12-13-li*̂. No cases in North Dakota.
Key 1^. Application to school purposes of school 
lands and proceeds thereof.
(a) State ex rel Board of University and
School Lands v. McMillan. (1903) 96 N. W. 310
(12 N. D. 280)
This action evolved an extensively written opinion 
%rhich may be briefed as follows: Under the authority of
Chapter 49, P. 54» Laws 1903» bonds on the amount of $60,000 
were issued, and the same were purchased by the board of 
university and school lands as an investment for the perma­
nent fund belonging to the common schools.
RULE: It was held, on an application to compel the
State Treasurer to pay a warrant for the purchase of said 
bonds, that they are void because of the invalidity of the 
act authorising their issuance, and for the further reason 
that they are not certified to be within the debt limit, as 
required by section 18? of the Constitution, and that the 
State Treasurer, in refusing to pay said warrant, acted in 
accord with his legal duty as the custodian of the trust 
fund.
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Key 16. School fimtfs.
Ho cftsoo liotod for North Dakota.
Key 17. Creation and sonrcos.
(a) State y. Stockwell.
For brief, see post Key U7» Case (a).
Further ruling in the case pertinent to this Key 
section:
Under Session Lavs 1901, c. 85 (Rev. Codes 1905» 
sections 869-876), fund for clerical assistance to Superin­
tendent of Public Instruction in reading teachers' ansirer 
papers, held a public fund, for the unexpended balance of 
%diich the superintendent is accountable to the state.
Key 18. Investment and administration.
(a) State v. McMi1Ian.
For brief, and ruling, see ante Key 15» Case (a).
(b) State ex rel. Board of Universitv and 
School Lands v. Hanson. ( 1932*.) 256 N. W. 201 (65
N. D. 1)
The ruling in this case, not the facts, is important: 
RULE: The State Board of University and School Lands
is authorized to invest permanent school fund of the state 
in first mortgages on farm lands in the state.
(c) State V. Divide County. (1939) 283  
N. W. 161*. (68 N. D. 7 08)
The ruling in this case, not the facts, is important.
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RULE; A  real estate mortgage executed to the state 
to secure loan made from the permanent fund conveys no title 
to land. It constitutes a mere pledge of land as security 
for the debt* and does not differ in nature from an ordinary 
real estate mortgage. (Lavs 1893» c. 116, section 3; Comp. 
Lavs 1913» section 288» as amended by Lavs 1931» c. 23i4-» 
Const, section 156.)
( d) Moses V. Baker. ( 19M) 299 N. W, 31$
(7 1  N. D. 11̂.0)
The rule» not the facts» needs be considered here.
RULE: (Comp. Lavs 1913» section 281*.; Const, section
156.} The Board of University and School Lands is vested 
vith discretion in the performance of directing the invest­
ment of the moneys of the permanent school fund.
The board %/as entitled to invest a portion of the 
money in the permanent school fund, in buying United States 
government bonds at a price greater than par» since the 
board may purchase securities for investment at a premium» 
if» in the exercise of its discretion» it is deemed proper 
to do so.
Kev 19. Apportionment and disposition.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 20. Regulation and supervision of schools and 
educational institutions in general.
(a) Todd V. Board of ^ucation of City of
Williston. ( 1926) 209 N, ¥. 369 (51*. N. D. 235)
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Tkis is an appeal from jadgment of the district court 
of Williams CouAty denying iajanctional relief against the 
defendant board of education of Williston.
FACTS a Plaintiff, who resided outside the limits of 
the Williston school district, refused to pay required tui­
tion in addition to the statutory tuition charges (Ch. 107» 
S. L. 1921) in cases Involving non-resident students. 
Plaintiff's two boys attended the Williston H i S c h o o l ,  but 
because father refused to pay required additional tuition, 
they were permitted to participate in school classes and 
some activities but were not officially enrolled. School 
required additional tuition charges because statutory tui­
tion alone did not meet per pupil expenses. The district 
had no accommodations for outside students until a plan was 
adopted under which non-resident pupils attending the high 
school paid an additional tuition with which the Williston 
school district was able to expand facilities.
QUESTION ; Whether or not the Board of Education of 
the Williston city was exercising discrimination in exclud­
ing the children of the plaintiff from the high school.
RULE : Non-resident students, pupils from districts
not affording high school facilities must be admitted into 
high school when facilities for seating and instruction 
shall warrant••.statutory provision as to the amount which 
may be charged non-resident pupil admitted into high school
.
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applies only where school already hes fadlities.•««where 
facilities for seating and Instraction do not warrant ad­
mission of non-resident, pupils» hnt provides for» and re­
ceives them as a favor» it may Impose tnition charge suffi­
cient to meet additional expenses thereby entailed.
DECISION : It was held that there was no discrimina­
tion on the part of the defendants in excluding the children 
of the plaintiff from the Williston High School. Original 
judgaent affirmed.
(b) Gerhardt v. Held. 26? N. W. 127 
(66 N. D. (See Kev 2)
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CREATIGN, ALTERATICM, EXISTENCE, AND I DISSOLUTKW OF DISTRICTS
Key 21. Nature and statas as corporations.
No cases in North Dakota.
Kev 22. Constitutional and statutory provisions.
(a) School District No. 9L v. King, et al.
(1910) 127 N. W. 515 (20 N. D. 6lk)
The Judgment in this case was for the defendants, and 
plaintiff appealed.
FACTS; Alleged that the defendants as board of edu­
cation made an order attaching to the village of Tower City 
for school purposes sections If, 5, 6, 7, 8, and 9, township 
lltO, range 55; that the order was based upon a petition 
which was fraudulently presented to the board, and that the 
order was void for the reason that the petition was not 
signed by a majority of the voters of the territory to be 
attached to the village for school purposes; that the 
annexed territory is more than three miles from the central 
school, and, therefore, requires a two-thirds vote of the 
school voters.
RULE: Section 9i*̂ 9, Rev. Codes 1905, states: When
any city, town, or village has been organized for school* 
purposes, and provided with a board of education under any 
general law, or a special act, or under the provisions of
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this articis» territory outside the limits thereof but ad­
jacent thereto may be attached to said city, town or village 
for school purposes, upon application in writing signed by a 
majority of the voters of said adjacent territory; provided 
that no territory shall be annexed which is at a greater 
distance than three miles from the central school except 
upon petition signed by two-thirds of the school voters re­
siding in the territory which is a greater distance than the 
three miles from the central school *...
DECISlew ; Judgment was affirmed for the defendants. 
The record showed that every requirement of the law was 
strictly complied with. The allegation of the complaint 
that the petition was "falsely and fraudulently" presented 
to the board of education was not followed by any proof to 
substantiate that general allegation.
Laws enacted for the consolidation or division of 
school districts are valid as resting solely on legislative 
discretion or policy, unless they are contrary to some con­
stitutional provision.
(b) Rosten v. Board of Educat ion of Vi 1laoe 
of Wild Rose. ( 1919) 173 N. W. i|.6l (J4.3 N. D. !̂ 6)
This is an injunctional action to restrain the de­
fendant school board from exercising Jurisdiction or author­
ity over certain territory which the defendant sought to 
annex to the Wild Rose special school district. Judgment
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for defendants, and plaintiffs appeal.
FACTS ; The board of education gave notice of the 
time and place of hearing a petition signed by a majority of 
the voters of the territory to be annexed. Between the time 
of filing the petition and the date of the hearing suffi­
cient numbers of the signers of the petition had withdrawn, 
in writing, their names from the petition and filed such 
withdrawals with the clerk of the school district prior to 
the time of the hearing, so that the number of the names re­
maining on the petition in favor of it, if the withdra%#al of 
the names was legal, would leave the petition with less than 
a majority of the qualified voters of the territory sought 
to be annexed.
RULE ; Comp. Laws 1913, Ch. I2I4.O (Sess. Laws 1911» 
c. 266 section 133)» is an amendment of Rev. Codes» Section 
914.9 » in respect to declaring of II4. days' notice of hearing 
before board of education can make an order annexing terri­
tory after five days from hearing on petition.
DECISION; Held» that such petitioners had the right 
to withdraw their names from the petition at any time before 
the board of education legally made an order annexing the 
territory ( Section 12I4.O, Comp. Laws 1913).
(c) Loucks V. Phelps. County Superintendent 
of Schools » et al. ( 1922)
This action is from a judgment in favor of the
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relator (Loucks), the respondents appealed. The action 
arose oat of an attempt to change the boundaries of an 
existing common school district by annexing thereto terri­
tory lying in adjacent school districts.
RULE: Chapter 197» Laws 1919» does not authorize the
creation of a new common school district from an entire 
existing common school district and portions of adjacent 
common school districts. In other words, the statute may 
not be used for the purpose of annexing territory to an 
existing common school district.
DECISION: Judgment affirmed.
(d) Jones ai. v. Briohtwood Independent
Schoo 1 District No. ^  al. ( 1933) N. W. 88I4.
(63 N. D. 275)
In action plaintiffs appealed from a Judgment for 
defendants.
Certain warrants were issued for fuel purchased for 
school use. Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants from 
levying taxes to pay those and other %#arrants and bonds 
issued by Brightwood School District on the grounds that in­
creased levies then went beyond limits authorized by law.
RULE ; Warrants Issued in anticipation of tax levies 
already made do not augment existing "indebtedness" of 
school district within meaning of the Constitution limiting 
school district indebtedness (Const. Section 8 3, as amended
in 1 920).
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Présomption: That the acts of school officers, done
in the performance of their doty, are legal, and bonds and 
warrants authorized by them are valid, the burden of proof 
is upon him who asserts to the contrary.
DECISION : Judgment affirmed for defendants.
Key 2 3. Creation and organization.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 2i|. (1). In general.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 2k (2). Attacking legality of organization.
(a) Weiderholt v* Lisbon Special School
District No. 19. (1918) 169 N. W. 809 (l*.l N.D. li+ô)
FACTS : This action was brought to enjoin the defend­
ants from asserting any Jurisdiction over certain territory 
that had been annexed to the defendant school district, or 
from levying upon or carrying forward upon the books of de­
fendant school district any taxes for the benefit of the 
district or certifying the same to the county auditor. 
Judgment was also asked against the school district for an 
amount paid in taxes during the year preceding the bringing 
of the action. Plaintiffs contend that the annexation pro­
ceedings were void for the reasons, chiefly: (a) that the
application therefor was not signed by the requisite number 
of qualified petitioners; (b) that the application was 
signed by some who were not residents or voters of the
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territory sought to be annexed; (c) that proper notice of 
the hearing of the application was not given; (d) that, 
after the application was signed by all the petitioners ex­
cept two, it was altered by one of the individual defend­
ants, a member of the defendant school board, by the addi­
tion of descriptions embracing additional territory..,.
RULE; A complaint which alleges nonexistence of 
facts required to give the school board authority to enlarge 
the district states a cause of action.
DECISION : Judgment reversed in favor of plaintiffs.
( b) Bi1lings School Pi sir let v, Loma 
Special School Dlst. (1928) 219 N. W. 3 3 6 (56
N. D. 7 5 1 )
FACTS : The controversy involved in this appeal by
plaintiffs and intervener (Storlie School District) grew out 
of the organization of Loma Special School District in Cava­
lier County. Certain territory within the boundaries of the 
plaintiff Billings School District was included within the 
boundaries of the Loma district, and the Billings district 
institutes this action to enjoin the defendant school dis­
trict and all connected officials from levying or assessing 
taxes or exercising any control over, or carrying on any 
functions whatsoever in said territory, or in any manner 
treating the same as a part of the defendant Loma Special 
School District. There was also included in the Loma
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district certain territory formerly within Storlie School 
District, and the latter asked for and was given leave to 
intervene in the action.
RULE; (1) In school district's suit to enjoin levy­
ing or assessing taxes in territory detached to form special 
school district, attack on incorporation of village organ­
ized as special school district is collateral and not avail­
able to plaintiff (Comp. Laws 1913» section 12l|.3).
(2) The legality of proceedings of a school board in 
re-forming a district by adding territory thereto, which 
could have been tested at the common law, may be tested in 
this state by a civil action in the district court under 
section 7969 of the Compiled Laws of 1913*
DECISION ; Judgment affirmed for defendants.
Key 25- Independent and other districts in incor­
porated cities, towns, and villages.
(a) Bi 1 lings School District v, Loma 
Sped al Schoo 1 Dist.
For brief, see case immediately preceding.
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
Incorporated village constituting part of three com­
mon school districts may be organized as special school , 
district (Comp. Laws 1913» section 12I4.3).
Key 2 6. Rural independent districts and other
«
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special organisations.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 2 7 . Proceedings for organization.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 28. De facto districts.
State V. Ferguson. ( 1912) 131̂. N, W, 872
(2 3  N. D. 153)
Case not pertinent. Application narrow.
Key 2 9 . Unorganized territory.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 3 0. Territorial extent and boundaries.
(a) Weeks v. Hetland et al. ( 1925) (City 
of Fargo et al Interveners) 202 N. W. 807 (52 N. D. 35D
In this action the plaintiffs sought to restrain the 
defendants, purporting to act as officers of school district 
No. 96 of Cass County, from entering and carrying out 
certain contracts and generally from functioning as officers 
of that district.
FACTS; Under the provisions of the legislative act 
creating the Fargo school district, providing that the title 
to all property of the Fargo school district shall be in the 
city of Fargo for the use and benefit of such district, and 
vesting in the board of education thereof authority to ad­
minister the affairs of the district and control over the 
property and funds of such district, it is held that both
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t.lie city of Fargo and the board of education have sufficient 
interest in a legal controversy begun as a taxpayer's suit 
and involving funds to which the district makes a claim» to 
warrant intervention as parties therein.
RULE; School district composed of Incorporated city 
alone is considered enlarged to include contiguous territory 
annexed to the city.
DECISIGN : Judgment affirmed for plaintiffs.
Key 3 1. Alteration and creation of new districts.
Constitutional and statutory provisions, see ante
Key 22.
Key 3 2. Change of boundaries.
(a) School District No. 9k v. Thompson. 
(1911*.) li+6 N. W, 727 (2 7 N. D. 1*.59)
FACTS; Plaintiff seeks to enjoin defendants, as 
officers of a special school district, from annexing cer­
tain adjacent territory to such district for school purposes,
under section 133, c. 266, Laws 1911, alleging as grounds
for such relief that the school district had unlawfully in­
curred an indebtedness exceeding the constitutional debt 
limit ; also that the petition for such annexation was not 
signed by qualified school voters in such adjacent territory.
RULE: That a special school district had unlawfully
incurred a debt exceeding the constitutional limit held 
immaterial and not ground for enjoining the officers of a
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special school district from annexing certain adjacent ter­
ritory under Laws 1911» c . 266, section 133*
DECISION; Plaintiff's petition denied.
( b) Weiderholt v. Lisbon Special School 
Dist. No. 19.
For brief see ante hey 2I4. (2), Case (a).
Further ruling in this case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
Where a school board entered an order of annexation 
under Comp. Laws 1913» section 12i|0, all parties acquiescing 
for nine months, and thereafter a signer of the petition and 
another sued to set aside the order and recover taxes paid, 
and asserted that plaintiffs, without sufficient excuse, 
delayed the prosecution so that a demurrer was not disposed 
of for more than a year and a half, and a trial was not had 
for more than three years, and in the meantime the assets 
and liabilities between the school districts had been 
settled, plaintiffs held to have been guilty of such laches 
as to preclude them from asserting the invalidity of the 
annexation proceedings.
(c) Loucks v. Phelps.
For brief, see ante Key 22, Case (a).
Purther ruling in this case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
In view of Laws 1917» c. 213* amending Comp. Laws
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1913» section III4.6 , held that Laws 1919, c. 197, docs not 
authorize the creation of a new conmon school district frcan 
an entire existing common school district and portions of 
adjacent common school districts.
Key 33* Consolidation, and union districts. 
Proceedings for consolidation, see post Key 37.
Review of proceedings, see post Key 39.
Key 3ii-. Division.
(a) Plummer et a 1 v. Borsheim. County 
Superintendent. ( 1Ô99) 80 N. W. 690 ( 8 N. D. 565)
FACTS; In this action the residents outside in the 
township outside the city of Hillsboro, population more than 
800, undertook to organize a separate school township. A 
petition was presented to the county superintendent of 
schools, and he was about to call an election, when this 
action was brought, setting forth the facts, and claiming 
that the procedure was unconstitutional, and praying that 
the defendant, county superintendent, be perpetually en­
joined from calling such election.
RULE; The word "city," as used in Laws 1899, c. 114.3 , 
section 1, providing that in any school township containing 
a city of 800 inhabitants or more, and which is not organ­
ized as an independent school district, the residents in 
said school township outside the city limits may separate 
themselves from the city, and organize a distinct school
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township, does not include incorporated towns or villages. 
(Hillsboro was not organized as an independent school dis­
trict.)
DECISION ; Judgment reversed in favor of plaintiffs.
(b) Tal Imadqe v . Walker. ( 1916) 159 N, W.
71 ( 3i4- N. D. 590)
FACTS ; This is an action to inquire into the valid­
ity of certain proceedings whereby an alleged new school 
district was organized out of a portion of an old district, 
and to inquire into the right of certain of the defendants 
to exercise the rights, duties, etc., pertaining to such 
offices. The holding in this case is important.
RULE : Under Comp. Laws 1913» section lll̂ .?» author­
izing the organization of new school districts, a special 
board composed of the board of county commissioners and 
county superintendent may organize new school districts 
from a portion of an old one or more.
Key 35* Change of organization to or from independ­
ent district.
(a) State ex re 1. Laird v. Gang. ( 1901)
8? N. W. 5 ( 10 N. 0. 331)
FACTS : The record of facts presents a great mass of
objections, exceptions, and so-called "assignments of er­
ror.” Briefly, the plaintiffs took this action to compel 
the defendant, county superintendent of schools, to call an
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election in Greenfield township for the purpose of electing 
school officers on the premiss that the township was a civil 
township, although it had never been allegedly legally or­
ganized into a civil toimship, nor had it become a distinct 
school corporation. Further, Greenfield civil township had 
never been segregated from the school township %Aich was 
known as "New City Township."
RULE ; Upon the organization into a civil township of 
a portion of the territory comprising a school township cor­
poration, held construing sections 6$8 , 6$9, Rev. Codes, 
that such a civil township continues for school purposes as 
a part of such school township corporation until segregated 
therefrom by the commissioners and county superintendent of 
schools, upon petition of voters.
DECISION ; Reversed in favor of defendant.
Key 3 6. Powers of boards or officers, and of courts.
{ a) Bloomington School Di strict No. 17 v. 
Larson. ( 1926) 207 N. W. 650 ( 53 N. D. 59I4.)
FACTS; In this action a petition for the organiza­
tion of a proposed school district came on to be heard be­
fore the board of county commissioners and the county super­
intendent of schools, pursuant to notice duly given, on July 
15* 1925- A number of persons residing within the Bloom­
field and St. Anna school districts filed protests against 
the granting of the petition. Portions of those districts
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were to have been Included in the organisation of a common 
school district from portions of three then existing common 
school districts. After a full hearing, an order was 
entered granting the petition for the organisation of the 
new proposed district. This action was then brought by the 
pla int iffs•
RULE ; Power of commissioners and superintendent to 
organise new school district from another, or from portions 
of one already organised on petition of voters in proposed 
district is to be exercised conformably and is subject only 
to act 1917* relating to changing common school district
boundaries (Laws 1919, c. 197; Comp. Laws 1913» section
111|.8; Laws 1917» c. 213).
Key 37* Proceedings in general.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 37 (2). Meetings and mode of action in general.
(a) McDona 1 d v, Hanson. ( 1917) I6i4_ N. W.
8 (37 N. D. 324)
FACTS ; Plaintiffs brought this action to restrain 
defendants from organising a new school district out of a 
certain township. Plaintiffs arc residents and taxpayers 
of the original school district Caledonia, which embraced 
the civil township of Hershberg. The petition for the 
organization of the new school district was filed with the 
county superintendent on May 6 , 1916, was in legal form.
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and contained more than three-fourths of all the legal 
school voters then residing in the territory which the 
petitioners wished to have created into a new school dis­
trict . Notice of the hearing of such petition was given by 
the county superintendent; and the notice stated that a 
hearing would be held in the courthouse on Wednesday,
July 19, A. D. 1916, at 2 o’clock p.m. The plaintiffs con­
tend that there was no legal notice of said hearing pub­
lished, and that the July meeting of the board of county 
commissioners was on the third day of July. Additional 
contentions are pertinent to the holding in the case.
RULE; Chapter 135 of the Session Laws of 1915 held
to provide two methods of organizing new common school dis­
tricts ;
(a) The first method is by presenting to the board 
of county commissioners and county superintendent a petition 
containing proper and legal requirements as to assessed 
valuation and extent of the territory to be contained in the 
new district to be organized, signed by a majority of the 
school voters in the districts whose boundaries will be 
affected by the organization of the new school district, and 
by at least three-fourths of the residents of the territory
to be included in the new school district. Such petition
*
must be heard upon 30 days’ notice, as provided by section 
lllj.8. Comp. Laws 1913, and only at the July meeting of the
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board of county commissioners, as provided by section III4.7 , 
Comp. Laws 1913.
(b) The second method of organizing a new common 
school district Is by petition signed by three-fourths of 
the school voters residing in the territory to be organized 
Into the new school district, such petition to comply with 
the requirements of law as to assessed valuation and extent 
of territory In both the old and the new districts. The 
notice required by section 1114.8 of the Compiled Laws of 
1913 shall also be given, but such petition may be acted 
upon at the July meeting or any other meeting of the board 
of county commissioners conjointly with the county superin­
tendent of schools.
In this case, the court ruled that Comp. Laws 1913, 
section III4.7 , as to time of hearing on petition for organi­
zation of new school districts, applies only to the first 
method of organization prescribed by Laws 191^, c. 135- 
DEClSION ; Judgment was affirmed for defendants.
(b) Anderson v. Peterson. ( 1952 ) 5̂4- M. W.
2d 5U2 (7 8  N. D. 514.1)
FACTS ; This is a suit brought by the plaintiffs as 
property owners, electors, school patrons, and taxpayers of 
a certain school district. They allege many irregularities 
in the reorganization of another school district, particu­
larly the inclusion of their own district. They also
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contend that the "Act to provide for the reorganization of 
school districts," Chapter 15-53, 1949 Supplement, NDRC 1943 
is unconstitutiona1, and to have declared null and void pro­
ceedings leading up to school district reorganization. The 
record of facts presents a great mass of objections, excep­
tions, and so-called "assignments of error."
RULE; (1) Provision of school district reorganiza­
tion act that each county committee shall conduct such pub­
lic hearings and hold such public meetings at such specified 
places throughout county as it may deem necessary to explain 
and acquaint people with provisions of act, manifests intent 
that only such hearings or meetings shall be held as the 
committee deems necessary to furnish to people with informa­
tion regarding the law, and word "shall" must be construed 
as permissive when considered with balance of provision. 
(NDRC 1949, Supp. 15-5310)
(2) In suit by school patrons to have school district 
reorganization proceedings declared null and void, wherein 
it was contended that county committee had abused its dis­
cretion in failing to call meetings in manner provided by 
statute for purpose of acquainting people with provisions 
of reorganization act, record established that meetings
which were held were sufficient to acquaint people with act
•
and that committee was Justified In proceeding to call meet­
ing for hearing on proposal for reorganization without
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holding further hearings for purpose of discussion of law. 
(NDRC 1949, Supp. 15-5301, 15-5310, 15-5313)
(3) County committee on school district's reorgani­
zation which attempted to ascertain wishes of patrons of re­
spective districts by appointment of committee for each dis­
trict to ascertain sentiment, and by holding of meeting to 
enable members of districts to decide whether they wished to 
be part of new district, did not act arbitrarily, discrimin­
ator ily, or in violation of the law when particular school 
district was included after failure of any of patrons from 
such district to register vote against participation.
DECISION ; Judgment reversed in favor of defendants.
Key 37 (3). Petition or consent.
(a) Schoo1 Di strict No. 94 v. Thompson.
For brief, see ante Key 32, Case (a).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
(1) A petition for the annexation of territory ad­
jacent to a special school district, under Laws 1911, c. 266, 
section 133, need not set forth all the facts the existence 
of which are essential to authorize annexation.
(2) That petitioners for annexation of territory ad­
jacent to a special school district, were not owners of the 
real property sought to be annexed, and that they contem­
plated removal from such land, held not to disqualify them
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from acting vAile voters in stich territory, (Laws 1911, 
c. 266, section 133.)
(b) Tallmadge v, Weber.
For brief, see Key 3k-» Case (b).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this hey 
section, as follows:
Where under a petition for two new school districts, 
under Comp. Laws 1913» section lllf.?, the board of county 
commissioners and county superintendant, pursuant to notice, 
proceed to organize two distinct new districts, the proceed­
ings were not a nullity, and were, at most, merely irregu­
lar, so that directors of the original school district could 
not complain.
(c) McDonald v. Hans on.
For brief, see ante Key 37 (2), Case (a).
Further ruling pertinent to this Key section, as 
follows :
Laws 1915» c. 135» held to provide method of organ­
izing new school districts by petition to county commission­
ers signed by majority of voters in districts whose bounda­
ries would be affected, and also by petition signed by 
three-fourths of voters in territory to be organized into 
new district, and both petitions must comply with Comp. Laws 
1913, section lll|.d.
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( d) Rostcn V, Board of Education of Vi liage
of WiId Rose»
For brief, see ante Key 22, Case (b).
Further ruling pertinent to this Key section, as 
follows :
Where special school district sought to annex certain 
territory and petition signed by majority of voters of ter­
ritory to be annexed was filed with district board of educa­
tion, which gave notice of time and place of hearing, part 
of signers of petition then had a legal right to withdraw 
their names frcm. the petition any time before board's legal 
order annexing such territory. (Ccnp. Laws 1913, sect. 
12k0.)
(e) State v, Stevens. ( 1921) 183 N. W.
(14.8 N. D. 14.7)
This case is governed by the principle contained in 
Rosten v. Board of Education immediately preceding.
(f) State V. Laman. ( 19214.) 20I4. N. W. 8I4.5
(52 N. D. 60)
QUESTION: Where the proposed new school district
embraces territory wholly within a given county, but some 
of which is taken from a school district \^ich lies within 
two counties, may the petition for such proposal be heard 
by the county commissioners and the county superintendent 
of the county within which the proposed new district would
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lie, or must it be heard by the county commissioners and the 
county superintendents of the two counties wherein one of 
the original districts lies? The facts in this case gave 
rise to that question.
RULE : Under Comp. Laws 1913, section lli|.7, as
amended by Sess. Laws 1919, c. 197, petition proposing or­
ganization of new school district from territory previously 
embraced within school district lying within two or more 
adjoining counties, must be presented for concurrent action 
to boards of county commissioners and county superintendents 
of counties within which original district was embraced, 
they being "affected" within meaning of statute, in view of 
section 13 27, and following provisions requiring representa­
tion by each district in adjusting assets and liabilities.
Key 37 Notice.
(a) School District No. 9li v. Thompson.
For brief, see ante Key 32, Case (a).
Further ruling pertinent to this Key section follows:
Notice of hearing of petition for the annexation of 
territory to a school district is sufficiently given when 
published once in the nearest newspaper II4. days prior to 
the hearing, and posted in the manner prescribed by such 
section.
Key 37 (5). Records, orders, and reports.
No cases in North Dakota.
*
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Key 38. Submission of question to popular vote,
(a) Iverson v. Williams School District.
For brief, see post Key 68, Case (c).
Further ruling pertinent to this section follows: 
Comp. Laws 1913, sections llBĴ , 118$, and 1190, and 
Laws 1915# c. 127* authorize the question of consolidation 
of schools to be determined exclusively by the voters in the 
common school districts.
Key 39. Review of proceedings.
The following cases were tried, but they are not sig­
nificant, nor are they pertinent to this compilation,
(a) State v . Thurs by-Butte Sped a 1 School 
Dist. No. 37 in McHenry County. ( 1920) 178 N. W. 787 
ih^ N. D. $55)
( b) State V. Strauss. ( 1922) 187 N. W.
96)4. (1#.8 N. D. 9 2 7)
Key 14.0 . Operation and effect.
(a) State v. Gang.
For brief, see ante Key 35* Case (a).
Further ruling pertinent to this Key section follows: 
Rev. Codes, section 6$8, provides that each civil 
township in every county not organized for school purposes 
at the taking effect of the act shall constitute a district 
school corporation, and Whenever a civil township Is there­
after organized it shall constitute a district school
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corporation, except as otherwise provided; and section 659 
provides that each school township in every county consist­
ing of territory not organized into a civil township shall 
remain a district corporation, and that, whenever such school 
township shall be organized into or annexed to a civil town­
ship, such civil township shall constitute a district school 
corporation, but that the act shall not be construed to 
alter the boundary lines of any school township previously 
organized, except on petition as thereinafter provided.
Held that, on the organization into a civil township of a 
portion of the territory comprising a school township cor­
poration, such civil township continues for school purposes 
as a part of such school township corporation unti1 segre­
gated therefrom by the commissioners and county superintend­
ent of schools on petition of the voters.
(b) Farley v. Lawton School Di strict No.
M.' (1912) 137 N. W. 821 (23 N, D. 565)
FACTS : This is an action in which the plaintiff
seeks to recover salary as a school teacher under a contract 
made with the school board of Homer school district. Prior 
to the date of such contract, the territory in which such 
school was located was duly segregated from Homer school
district and organized into a separate and distinct school
#
corporation, known as Lawton school district No, !̂ l, the 
defendant, although the school officials for such new
• •
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district were not elected and did not qualify unti1 later.
RULE! Where county commissioners and county super­
intendent of schools « under Rev. Codes 1905» sections 786, 
792, 791*.» 7 9 6, segregated some territory from a school dis­
trict and created a new one, and the school board of the old 
district ceased to possess any authority over the schools in 
such new district, the contract by such school board with a
teacher in the new district was of no effect.
Key l*.l. Adjustment of pre-existing rights and 
liabilities•
Key l*.l (1). Property and funds.
(a) State ex rel« Reynolds Specia1 School
District V. School District No. 21. ( 1697 ) 71 N. W.
772 ( 6  N. D. 14.86)
FACTS : This is an action in which a school district
was divided, by the organization of a city or incorporated 
town or village situated within said district, into a 
special school district. The schoolhouse that had original­
ly belonged to and been used by school district No. 21, de­
fendants, remained in that district, being situated outside 
the limits of the incorporated town. After the organization 
of the Reynolds special school district, an effort was made 
to effect an equalization as contemplated by Laws I89O, 
c. 6 2, section 190. To that end, said special school dis­
trict appointed an arbitrator, and that portion of the old
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school district No* 21 outside the special district, and 
which, of course, still constituted school district No. 21, 
appointed the county superintendent and two defendant arbi­
trators . The arbitrators proceeded to apportion the money 
on hand, and the uncollected taxes, and the outstanding in­
debtedness of the original district; but the defendant arbi­
trators refused to in any manner consider the schoolhouse 
and furniture as exclusive property of school district No. 
2 1. Thereupon this action was brought by the special school 
district against the original school district No* 21, and 
against the defendant arbitrators, to compel an adjustment 
of the rights and claims of the respective districts to the 
said schoolhouse and furniture.
RULE; Where a school district is divided, by the 
organization of a city or incorporated town or village 
situated within said district, into a special school dis­
trict, under the provisions of chapter 62, Laws 1890, the 
board of arbitration provided for by said chapter to equal­
ize the interests of said districts must take into consider­
ation the school building owned by the original district, 
and adjust the rights of the respective districts concerning 
the same.
DECISION : Reversed in favor of plaintiffs.
m
{ b) State V. Tucker.
For brief, see post Key 57# Case (a).
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Further ruling pertinent to this Key section follows: 
Uncollected taxes should be taken into account under 
Comp. Laws 1913, section 1328, in case of annexation by one 
school district of part of another.
Key Li (2). Liabilities.
(a) Coler v. Dwiqht Schoo1 Township.
( 1893) 55 N. W. 587 (3 N. D. 21+9) 28 L. R. A, 61+9 
FACTS : The county superintendent of schools, under 
chapter li+. Laws 18?9, organized a school district. School 
district officers were elected, and exercised the functions 
of their respective offices; teachers were employed by the 
district and school was taught, and a school meeting was 
held in the district to vote upon the question of issuing 
bonds to build a schoolhouse. Such bonds were thereafter 
issued. In an action upon some of the interest coupons of 
such bonds, held that the district was a de facto municipal 
corporation, and that therefore the defense could not be 
interposed that the bonds were void on the ground that the 
district had no legal existence because of failure to comply 
with certain provisions of the statute regulating the organ- 
izat ion of districts in matters which went to the jurisdic­
tion of the county superintendent to organize the district.
RULE; A school township organized under Laws I8 8 3, 
c. 1+1+, becomes, immediately upon such organization, liable 
for the debts of a district, and the schoolhouse and
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furniture become the property of the township. And this 
liability is complete, and does not depend upon the settle­
ment of equities between several districts included in the 
new school township, under Laws IÔ8 3, c. sections 136-
1 3 8.
(b) Coler v. Coppin. ( 1901) 85 N. W. 988
(10 N. D. 66)
For brief, see case immediately preceding.
Further ruling pertinent to this Key section follows:
A school township organized under Laws I883, c. 
became by such organization liable for the debts of the old 
districts whose territory was included in such townships.
(c) State V. Rasmusson.
For brief, see post Key 100, Case (a).
Further rule pertinent to this Key section follows:
The rights of purchasers of bonds of school districts 
are subject to statutory provisions in effect at the time of 
the issuance of the bonds, relating to detachment of terri­
tory from school districts, organization of new school dis­
tricts, and the equalization of property, funds on hand, and 
debts between school districts which have been affected by a 
change in boundaries. (Comp. Laws 1913# sections IH4.7 , I327,
1 3 2 8, 1 3 3 6.)
m
Key ill ( 3). Proceedings for apportionment of assets 
and liabilities.
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(a) State ex rel. Reynolds Special School
Di strict V. School District No. 21.
For briefj see ante Key ii.1 (1), Case (a). Same rule 
applies herein.
(b) School Di strict No. 9k v. Special
School Dist. No. ( 1916) 157 N. W. 28? (33 N. D.
353)
FACTS; Two school districts of Cass County changed 
their boundaries. Arbitrators were appointed to equalize 
the property and debts. Their decision gave to plaintiff 
the sum of $239.8?. The defendant then and ever since has 
refused to pay that sum to the plaintiff. It was held that 
the plaintiff had no cause of action, based on Ccmp. Laws 
1913, sections 1327, 1331.
RULE ; Arbitration to equalize property and debts of 
school districts on change of boundaries resulting in a%fard 
of specific sum to one district was pursuant to Laws cited 
in above paragraph, which provide that the arbitrators shall
make a return of their findings to the county auditor, who
shall thereupon extend a tax against the property situated 
within the districts to pay the various awards, and that the 
same shall be paid as taxes are collected.
Key k2. Formation of districts and annexation and 
detachment of territory for special purposes.
Key k2 ( 1). In general.
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(a) Greenfield School District v. Hannaford 
Special School District. (1910) 127 N. W. U99 (20
N. D, 393)
FACTS and HOLDING; Where the board of education of a 
special school district under Rev. Codes 1905» section 9U9, 
annexed adjacent territory, and a division of the funds and 
property was made after annexation, and no objection was 
made to such annexation for more than two years, and at a 
meeting for the purpose of dividing the property and obliga­
tions of the territory divided no protest was filed, and an 
arbitration agreement was entered into, and the school dis­
trict thus created levied school taxes on all its property, 
and bonds were voted for the erection of a new schoolhouse, 
which was thereafter erected, and taxes were levied and col­
lected under the new conditions, held that the plaintiffs 
are estopped from questioning the validity of proceedings of 
the board of education in annexing adjacent territory,
{b) State ex rel. Nicholson v. Ferguson 
et. aj,. (1921) 13k N. W. 8?2 (23 N. D. 153)
FACTS ! This is an action in which the voters in a 
civil township comprising a portion of a special school dis­
trict petitioned the board of county commissioners and the
county superintendent of schools to have the township set
#
off into a separate school district.
RULE: Under Rev. Codes 1905, section 914-9 , voters in
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the civil township were not entitled to the relief prayed 
for. The section provides : "That the county ccxnmissi oners
shall detach any part of such adjacent territory which is at 
a greater distance than three miles from the central school 
in such special district and attach any adjacent school or 
special school district or districts upon petition to do so, 
signed by three-fourths of the legal voters of such adjacent 
territory,"
(c) Sorenson v, Tobiason. (1922) l88 
N. W. I4.I (1+8 N. D. 921+)
FACTS ; This is an action in which the board of 
county commissioners and the county superintendent detached 
from a special school district territory lying within three 
miles of the central school. The action is from a Judgment 
against the defendant officers, and they appeal.
RULE; Laws 1919, c. 197» construed in its relation 
to Comp. Laws 1913» section 121+0, and Laws 1919» c. 196, 
amending section 111+7 , governing the territory embraced in 
special school districts and providing for attaching and 
detaching territory, do not authorize detachment of terri­
tory within three miles of the central school. In view of 
Rev, Codes 1905, section 781+ et seq, (Comp. Laws 1913, 
sections 1 229, 121+0 ),
DECISION ; Affirmed for plaintiffs,
(d) Harrison School District No, 2_ v, City
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of Ml not « ( 1922) 189 N. W. 338 <1̂.8 N. D. II89)
FACTS; This action was brought to restrain the board 
of education of the city of Minot from levying taxes and 
from exercising any Jurisdiction over certain territory de­
scribed in the complaint. The ultimate question presented 
is whether the territory In dispute is a part of Minot 
special school district and under the Jurisdiction of the 
board of education of that city, or whether such territory 
is a part of the plaintiff school district and under the 
Jurisdiction of its officers. Prior to the year 1909# a 
large portion of the northwest section of the city of Minot 
had a separate legal existence and was commonly designated 
as "North Minot." North Minot was in fact embraced within, 
and a portion of, an organised township known as Harrison 
Township (plaintiff). In 1909 North Minot was annexed to 
the city of Minot. The question arises: Did the extension
of the limits of the city of Minot also extend the limits 
of the Minot special school district No. 1, and make the 
territory so attached to the city a part of such special 
school district?
RULE; (1) Under Corap. Laws 1913# sections 1229, 
1230# 12i4.0 , 12kl, 12W# 12S1# 12514# 1260, 1261, and in view 
of the legislative history thereof, a special school dis-
•
trict can be organized only from a platted or incorporated 
city, town, or village, or fr<wn such city, town or village
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and territory contiguous thereto.
(2) Where an incorporated city is organized into a 
special school district, all the territory within the city 
must be included within the special school district.
(3) Where a special school district is composed of 
an incorporated city alone, and the city limits are extended 
by the annexation of contiguous territory to the city, the 
special school district is enlarged so as to include the 
territory annexed to the city.
DECISION ; Judgment for defendants affirmed.
( e) Common School Dis trlet No. 126 of Cass
Co%mtv V, City of Fargo. ( 1952) 51 N. W. 2d 36i|.
(78 N. D. 583)
In addition to the rules and holdings in the case 
immediately preceding (Harrison School Pis trict No. 2 v.
City of ^argo). the following prevailed:
Where city organized as special school district 
annexed territory under statutes relating to annexation of 
territory by cities, the territory annexed automatically 
became part of the special school district of the city, re­
gardless of the limitation of the statute prohibiting de­
tachment from one school district for annexation to special 
district if part of original district remaining after pro­
posed annexation would have assessed valuation of less than 
$100,000 for each teacher employed in remaining territory
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or less than $12S*000 for each teacher employed in remaining 
territory, if remaining territory had graded or consolidated 
school with two or more teachers. (NDRC 1914-3, 15-2701 ct 
seq., 15-2716, i#-0-5l01 et seq.)
Key I42 ( 2). High school and graded school districts.
(a) Olson V. CoalfieId School District 
No. 16 of Divide County. ( 1926) 208 N. W. 1514-
(53 N. D. 575)
FACTS: This is an action brought to challenge the
establishment of a Joint high school district pursuant to 
the provisions of sections 1192, 1193» and 11914-» Comp. Laws 
1913. Briefly, the voters in three school districts (one a 
special district, and two common school districts) voted in 
favor of establishing the proposed Joint district high 
school. The plaintiffs, as ground for challenge, two propo­
sitions from which only the following need be noted: that
the statute under which the proposed establishment of a
Joint district high school was pursued contemplates that a 
district high school may be established only in common 
school districts, and that one of the school districts in­
volved in this proposal is a special high school district. 
There was no controversy as to the essential and controlling 
matters of fact in the case. The district court held for
•
the defendants.
RULE: (1) Provisions of statutes relating to
«
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
52
establishment of district high schools or graded schools or 
both held to apply only to common school districts, and not 
to special school districts, and special school district 
cannot Join with common school districts in election to es­
tablish district high school. (C. L. 1913, sec. 1151» 1192, 
1194, 1229, 1245)
(2) Election of special school district and two com­
mon school districts to establish Joint school district can­
not authorize establishment of Joint high school by the two 
common school districts only. (Comp. Laws 1913, sections 
1151, 1192, 1194, 1229, 1245)
(3) Where two or more school districts Join to es­
tablish and maintain district high school, no one of such 
districts need possess qualifications required by statute as 
to school population and number of schools contained there­
in, but it is sufficient if all districts taken together 
possess such qualifications. (See citations in above para­
graphs . )
DECISION ; Judgment reversed in favor of plaintiffs.
( b ) Olson et al v . Coalfield School Pis-
trict No. 16 of Divi de County. ( 1926) 210 N. W. l80
(54 N. D. 657)
(See case immediately preceding.)
FACTS ; At the time the hearing was held in the case 
immediately preceding, the Joint high school district, with
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a school at Noonan, was already in full operation. The 
court in the above case reversed Judgment in favor of the 
plaintiffs, and allowed that the organization of the school . 
district was Irregular and illegal. However, the plaintiffs 
did not bring the action soon enough. And in this action 
they sought to restrain and enjoin the Coalfield school dis­
trict No. 16, Brown school district No, 1̂.0, and the board of 
education of the special school district (village of Kermit) 
from in any manner proceeding to further organize, operate 
or continue a high school known as the Noonan district high 
school.
RULE; When high school is organized, taxes levied, 
buildings constructed, teachers employed, and school con­
ducted for nine months, acquiescence for such period estops 
objectors to question regularity of organization proceedings.
Key 14.3 . Enumeration of children for school purposes.
No cases in North Dakota. 
kk-» Dissolution.
No cases in North Dakota.
« •
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CHAPTER V
GOVERNMENT, OFFICERS, AND DISTRICT MEETINGS
Key î.5* Administration of school affairs in general.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 1̂,6. Constitutional and statutory provisions.
(a) State ex rel. Langer. Atty. Gen.. et al 
V. Totten et al. (1919) 175 N. W, 563 ( N. D. 557) 
FACTS ; This is an original application to this
supreme court to compel the board of administration and the 
educational commission to refrain from preparing and pre­
scribing the courses of study for the common school of the 
state.
(For brief and rule. see post Key 161|., Case (a).)
(b) State ex rel. Agneberg v. Peterson, 
School Clerk. ( 192l|.) 201 N. W. 856 (52 N. D. 120)
The sole question presented on this appeal is whether
the office of school treasurer in a special school district, 
lying partly without an incorporated village, is elective or 
appointive.
RULE ; Laws 1913# c . 256, providing for appointment 
of clerk and treasurer of special school district, repeals 
Laws 1911, c. 266, section lif.7, providing that treasurer of 
city, etc., comprising special district, shall be treasurer 
of board of education, and that in certain cases such
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officer should be elected.
(c) Batty V. Board of Education of City of 
Wi111 Ston.
For brief, see ante Key 11, Case (b).
Further ruling pertinent to this Key section follows; 
Statute authorizing school board to adopt and enforce 
rules and regulations for conduct of schools must be consid­
ered in light of legislative policy that public schools 
shall be equally free, open, and accessible to all children 
over six and under twenty-one years of age in district 
wherein schools are maintained (Ccmp. Laws 1913* sections 
1251» subsec. 11, 1314.35 Const, section II4.7 et seq.).
Key I4.7 . State boards and officers.
(a) State v . Stockwe11. Supt. Public In- 
struction. (1912) 134 N. W. 767 (23 N. D. 70)
FACTS : During the three terms that the defendant 
held the office as Superintendent of Public Instruction 
certain moneys came into his possession regularly by virtue 
of his office. A certain amount of these unexpended moneys 
were retained by him, and accounted for, personally by him 
after the expiration of his term, under his claim in good 
faith that he was entitled to retain same as owner thereof;
and that acting thereon to determine the law involved this
#
action was brought.
RULE: (1) Legislature, in giving the State Super-
• •
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intendent of Public Instruction authority to disburse fund 
for clerical assistance for reading teachers' answer papers, 
held not to constitute him the owner of the fund.
(2) Burden of establishing title to fund collected 
under Sess. Laws 1901, c. 85 (Rev. Codes 1905» sections 
869-876), in State Superintendent of Public Instruction 
individually he Id to be upon him, and not on the state to 
establish want of ownership on his part.
(3) Under Rev. Codes 1905» sections 101, k20, 14-2 1 , 
formerly Rev. Codes 1895» sections 98, 357» 358, and Rev. 
Codes 1905, section 103» Superintendent of Public Instruc- 
t i on he Id required to account not later than expiration of 
each term of office for unexpended balance of fund created 
by Sess. Laws 1901, c. 85 (Rev. Codes 105» sections 869-
876).
(b) McDonaId v, Nielsen.
For brief, see post Key I3 0 , Case (a).
Same rule appertains to this section.
Key I4.8 . County boards and officers.
Appeal from proceedings for creation of independent 
district, see ante Key 27.
Powers relative to division of districts, see ante
Key 36.
Key ifS ( 1). Appointment or election.
No cases in North Dakota.
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Kê r 1̂ 8 (2). Eligibility and qualification.
(a) Wendt v. Waller. ( 1920) 1?6 N. W. 930
(1|.6 N. D. 268)
FACTS and HOLDING; The defendant is holder of a pro­
fessional certificate of the second grade which plaintiffs 
contend he received fraudulently. There is no proof that 
their contention is correct. This proceeding was brought by 
plaintiffs to determine title to the office of county super­
intendent of schools to which the defendant had been elected 
in Ward county. It was held: "The Legislature having im­
posed upon the superintendent of public instruction the 
duties of determining the existence of the necessary quali­
fications for a second grade professional certificate and of 
revoking those improperly issued, a review of such determi­
nation by court, except for fraud, or an original attempt to 
impeach a certificate in a judicial proceeding, involves a 
collateral attack on the certificate.
DECISION : Judgment for defendant affirmed.
Key 1+8 (3). Term of office, vacancies, and holding
over.
(a) Bickford v. Fa brick. ( 190?) 112 N, W.
71+ ( 16 N. D. 91+)
Inasmuch as this case does not strictly pertain to
#
the study of schools and school districts, only statute is 
set forth:
# •
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Under Rev. Codes 1899, section 6 3 8, and Rev. Codes 
1905, section 76!*., providing that the term of office of a 
county superintendent of schools shall be two years, com­
mencing on the first Monday in January after his election, 
and until his successor is elected and qualifies, a duly 
elected and qualified acting county superintendent continues 
as such until his successor is elected and qualifies.
( b) J enness v. Clark. ( 1910) 129 N. W.
357 (21 N. D. 150) Ann. Cas. I913B, 675.
As in the preceding case, this action was brought to 
determine entitlement to the office of county superintendent 
of schools.
For rule, see final paragraph in preceding case.
Key UQ (it). Removal or suspension.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key it8 (5). Compensation.
Inasmuch as the cases in this Key section do not 
strictly apply to a study of schools and school districts, 
only the statutes and holdings are set forth. For facts, 
investigate citations.
(a) Wi les V. McIntosh. ( 1901) 88 N. W.
710 ( 10 N. D. 59I4.)
Under Rev. Codes, section 652, providing that, in 
computing the salary of county superintendent, no school 
shall be included unless it has been taught at least three
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months during the preceding year, and that the amount of his 
salary shall be determined each year by the actual number of 
schools or separate departments in graded schools, the sala­
ries must be computed on the basis of the number of schools 
or separate departments of graded schools presided over by 
the superintendents, which have been taught at least three
months in the preceding year and are not to be computed on
the number of schools Wiich have been taught less than three 
months•
( b) Dickey County v. Denning. ( 1905)
103 N. W. U22 ( li+ N. D. 77)
Under Revised Codes 1Ô99» section 652, providing for 
a graduated salary for county superintendents of schools 
corresponding to the number of schools or departments of 
graded schools under their official supervision in the pre­
ceding year, schools in the special districts are not under 
their official supervision, and are not to be included in 
computing their salary.
(See also Dickev County v. Hicks. ( 1905) 103 N. W,
1*23 ( Ih N. D. 73)
(c) State ex rel. Bickford v, Fabrick.
See Key i|.8 (3), Case (a).
Further ruling in the case, as follows:
#
A county superintendent of schools, lawfully holding 
over after two years from his qualification as such, and
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( 1) Where a proceeding has been instituted attempt­
ing to challenge the validity of the formation of certain 
reorganized districts purported to have been created under 
the provisions of Chapter 15-53» NDRC I9I4.3 and the 1914.9 
Supplement thereto, and also attempting to challenge the 
validity of the election of the school boards of such dis­
tricts, and the Judge of the district court has issued a 
memorandum opinion stating his determination to make an 
order which will permit the boards of the new districts to 
function in part and the boards of the old districts to also 
function in part as governing bodies of districts embracing 
the same or part of the same territory, thereby creating 
confusion and duplication, public interest requires that 
such a result be avoided, and, there being no speedy remedy 
available, the exigency of the situation Justifies the 
interposition of the general superintending power vested in 
this court by the constitution.
(2) Section 15-5322, 1914-9 Supplement NDRC 1914-3» 
authorizes the election of school boards of newly elected 
school districts at special elections, and a board so chosen 
enters upon its duties on the first day of July succeeding 
the final approval of the organized district. Where final 
approval of the district is had before July 1st and its 
board is elected at a special election held after July 1st, 
the board may organize and enter upon its duties forthwith.
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Key 5U* Compensation,
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 55» Powers and functions in general.
(a) Pronovost v. Brunette. (1917)
162 N. W. 300 (36 N. D. 288)
FACTS : A resolution was passed by the school board
providing for the calling of a special election "to vote on 
the question whether or not the school in school district 
No. i|.0, Cass County, shall be changed and removed from the 
present schoolhouse to a room in St. Joseph’s Convent in the 
same district."
HOLDING: That both the order of the school board and
the election were void, and that the lease of the new build­
ing and the removal of the one school to the other were un­
warranted by the law and outside the power of the directors. 
The legislative policy in North Dakota is that the public 
schools in the common school districts of the state shall be 
maintained in buildings which are owned by the public.
( b) Rhea v. Board of Education of Devi Is 
Lake School Dist. ( 1919) 171 N. W. 103 ( î-l N. D.
kk9)
QUESTION ; The non-vaccination of children is it
cause for excluding them from public schools in a state
#
where smallpox does not prevail, and where the sickness and 
death resulting from vaccination far exceed that now
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resulting from smallpox?
RULE; Boards of education and boards of health pos­
sess only such powers as the statutes confer upon them. 
Sections 1346 and 426, Comp. Laws 1913* are he Id not to 
authorize the exclusion for non-vaccination...
( c ) Gi1lespie v. Common School District 
No. 8 of McClean County. { 192?) 216 N. W. 564
( 56 N. D. 194)
FACTS; This is an action in which the plaintiff, an 
architect, conferred with two members of a school board with 
respect to the matter of preparing plans and specifications 
for a school building. The meeting was informal and no min­
utes were kept, though the clerk of the school board was 
present. A contract was signed, purporting to be made by 
and between the plaintiff and "the board of Underwood school 
district No. 6," after the meeting. Subsequently the con­
tract %fas also signed by a third director who had not been 
at the meeting. Some time later the school board notified 
the architect (Gillespie) that they would no longer require 
his services, and they entered into another contract with 
another architect and built the schoolhouse. Gillespie then 
demanded payment of the remainder of the compensation which 
he claimed under the contract, and when payment was refused 
brought this action.
RULE; A  school district is not bound by the action
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of its directors unless such action is taken at a meeting 
held and conducted as required by statute (Comp. Laws 1913, 
section 1160). School directors are agents of the district.
Key 56. Modes of action in general.
No cases in North Dakota.
(a) MeWithy v. Heart River School Dist.
No. 22. ( 191|-8)
For brief, see post Key ll|.l (5), Case (a).
Further ruling pertinent to this Key section, as 
follows :
School boards have only such powers as statutes con­
fer on them.
Key 57. Meetings.
(a) State v. Tucker. (1918) 166 N. W. 820
(39 N. D. 106)
In this action a mandamus is sought to compel a board 
of arbitrators to reconvene and cause a due and proper levy 
to be made upon the real and personal property of a school 
district. This action occurred because the plaintiffs 
charged that the original meeting was improperly held inas­
much as no written or printed notice of the meeting was 
given to officials who were to appoint an arbitrator at a 
special meeting.
RULE ; An appointment of an arbitrator which is made 
at a special meeting of a school board which is not called
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in the manner prescribed by statute, and frcan which one of 
the members is absent on account of not having received 
notice thereof, is not binding upon the school district.
Section 12k7 of the Compiled Laws of 1913 provides 
that : "Special meetings may be called by the president or
in his absence by any two members of the board or by causing 
a written or printed notice to be left at his.•.residence, 
at least forty-eight hours before the time of such meeting."
( b) Gi1lespie v. Common School Dist. No. 8 , 
McClean County. ( 1927) 216 N. W. 56î. (56 N. D. 194)
(See Key 55» Case ( c ) )
Key 58-59. No cases listed.
Key 60. Operation and effect of decisions.
No cases listed in North Dakota.
Key 61. Appeal from decisions.
No cases listed for North Dakota.
Key 62. Liabilities of members.
( a) Kenmare School District No. Ward
County V. Cole et al. ( 1917) l6 l N. W. 5^2 ( 36 
N. D. 32)
This is an action brought by the school district 
against the members of the school board in which it is 
sought to hold the latter personally liable for the payments 
they made when they entered Into contracts on behalf of the 
district involving obligations in excess of debt limit and
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in excess of the power to levy taxes, which contracts were 
fully performed, resulting in the construction and equipment 
of a high school building and in the issuance amd payment of 
warrants for it.
RULE; Members of school board whose contracts for 
construction and equipment of high school building Involved 
obligations in excess of debt limit and power to levy taxes, 
in violation of Comp. Laws 1913, Section 2218, were not, in 
absence of fraud, personally liable for payments so made.
So it was held.
Key 6 3. District and other local officers.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 63 (1). Appointment, qualification and tenure.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 63 (2). Title to and possession of office.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 63 (3). Powers, duties, and liabilities in 
general.
(a) Gi1lespie v. Common School Dist. No. Ô, 
McClean County. ( 1927) 216 N. W. (56 N. D, 194)
( See Key 55» Case (c))
School officers have and may exercise only powers ex­
press ly or impliedly granted by statute (Comp. Laws 1913,
#
Section 1160).
( b) Schoo 1 Di st. No. 35 of. Cass County v.
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in excess of* the power to levy taxes, which contracts were 
fully performed, resulting in the construction and equipment 
of a high school building and in the Issuance and payment of 
warrants for it.
RULE; Members of school board whose contracts for 
construction and equipment of high school building involved 
obligations in excess of debt limit and power to levy taxes, 
in violation of Comp. Laws 1913, Section 2218, were not, in 
absence of fraud, personally liable for payments so made.
So it was held.
Key 6 3. District and other local officers.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 63 (1). Appointment, qualification and tenure.
No cases in North Dakota.
• Key 63 (2). Title to and possession of office.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 63 (3). Powers, duties, and liabilities in 
general.
(a) Gi1lespie v. Common School Dist. No. 8, 
McClean County. ( 1927) 216 N. W. 5614. ( 56 N. D. 1914.) 
(See Key 55» Case (c))
School officers have and may exercise only powers ex­
press ly or impliedly granted by statute (Comp. Laws 19I3 ,
*
Section 1160).
(b) School Dist. No. 35 of Cass County v.
#
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Shinn. ( 1931) 237 N. W. 693 (6 l N. D. 160)
Plaintiffs brought action to recover alleged unlawful 
payment of school district funds, approved and made by the 
defendant as director and treasurer of the school district.
The alleged unlawful payments of school district 
funds were approved and made by the Individual defendants 
as directors and treasurer.
RULE; Under Section 1168, Comp. Laws 1913» providing 
that the school treasurer shall pay all warrants properly 
dravm and signed when presented, if there Is any money In 
his hands or subject to his order for payment, a treasurer 
who pays for unauthorized or unlawful purposes Is not liable 
on account of such payments, though he had knowledge of the 
purposes for which the warrants were Issued, where they were 
properly drawn and signed, and were not paid In bad faith or 
with unlawful or fraudulent intent on his part.
Key 63 ( 2*.). Liability on official bonds.
( a) Prairie School Tp. v. Hase leu ( 1893)
55 N. W. 938 ( 3 N. D. 326)
In this action bonds were issued and sold by the 
school board, consisting of the treasurer, clerk and direc­
tor, but the proceeds thereof were not paid to the treasurer.
RULE: Laws I6 8 3, c. W^» section 35* requires the
treasurer of a school township to give a bond for the dis­
charge of the duties of the office, and for the rendition of
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
68
a true account of money which shall come into his hands as 
treasurer.
DECI5IGM: Where bonds were issued and sold by the
school board but the proceeds thereof were not paid to the 
treasurer, the sureties on his bond, drawn substantially in 
the terms of the statute are not liable for the loss of 
funds•
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DISTRICT PROPERTY, CONTRACTS, AND LIABILITIES
Key 61|.. Capacity to acquire and hold property.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 65. Acquisition, use and disposition of 
property in general.
No cases pertinent to this study.
Key 66. School buildings.
Power to incur debts for school buildings.
(See post Key 90)
Key 6 7. Authority and duty to provide.
(a) State v. Mostad et al. School
Directors. (1916) 158 N. W. 349 (34 N. D. 330)
This is a special proceeding under Comp, Laws 1913, 
Section 1188, by the State, on the relation of J . C. John­
son, against Thorwald Mostad and others, as directors of 
School District No. 10, in and for Ward County, to compel 
the erection of a school to accommodate children now distant 
more than two and one-half miles from any school in the dis­
trict.
FACTS; A qualified petition requesting that a school 
be organized for nine or more children living not less than 
two and one-half miles from the nearest school was presented 
to the school board of District No, 10. After submitting
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the <|uestion to a vote of the people, the majority of Artiom 
voted against, the school board refused on their own author­
ity, and on the authority granted by section 1185 of the 
Conpiled Laws, to choose a site and erect a building.
RULE ; In construing section 1188 of the Compiled 
Laws of 1913, which provides that school boards of the vari­
ous common school districts shall, upon the petition of 
those charged with the support and having the care and cus­
tody of nine or more children of school age, furnish accom­
modations for such children within a distance of two and 
one-half miles from their homes, such two and one-half miles 
to be measured by the roads which are actually opened and 
passable, and not as the crow flies, or by taking into con­
sideration section lines which are set apart by section 1920 
as highways, but which are not in their present condition 
passable, and have not been actually opened for travel. 
DECISION ; Affirmed for the plaintiff.
(b) Kretchmer et al v. School Board of 
Di strict No. 12. Barnes County, et al. ( 1916)
158 N. W. 993 (34 N. D, 4 0 3)
FACTS; The plaintiffs seek to enjoin the school 
board from maintaining an alleged high school in the dis­
trict before first submitting the question of such addi-
#
tional high school to the voters of the district.
RULE; Under Compiled Laws 1913» sections 1174, 118 4,
«
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a district school board has no authority to establish an 
additional school in a new location even if not intended as 
high school without submission of question to popular vote. 
DECISION; Held for plaintiffs.
(c) Wulfkhul V. Galehouse. ( 1918) 168
N. W. 620 (if.0 N. D. 172)
Facts similar to those in Case (a) this Key. Ruled 
as in Case ( a).
( d) Henderson et al v. Long Creek School 
Di st. No. 2 oT Divide County et al. (1919) 171
N. W. 825 (If.1 N. D. 6I4.O)
In this action» to recover for labor and materials 
furnished» the complaint alleged that the plaintiffs erected 
a schoolhouse which was needed for the accommodation of the 
school children of the defendant district» and that such 
action was taken by plaintiffs following an adverse vote at 
two separate elections on the proposition of bonding the 
district for the purpose of erecting a schoolhouse to take 
the place of a building which had been condemned by the 
board of health.
FACTS; As alleged in the foregoing paragraph.
RULE: Section II8I4. of the Compiled Laws of 1913
authorizes boards of directors of common school districts 
to erect schooIhouses only when directed to do so by a 
majority of voters of the district.
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DECISICM : Complaint does not state a cause of action.
He Id for defendants.
Key 68, Location.
(a) Farmers * and Merchants * National Bank
of Valley City v. School Pi strict No. $3. ( l869)
42 N. W. 76? (6 Dak. 2^5)
FACTS: The action was brought to enforce payment of
certain school warrants alleged to have been issued by the 
defendant through its school board. Findings of fact were 
made that the inhabitants of the district did not direct the 
making of or make the contract under iidiich the schoolhouse 
was erected, did not consent to it, did not select it or 
authorize the selection of the site upon which it was to be 
erected, and had never in any way ratified the acts of the 
school board in issuing warrants for the construction of a 
schoolhouse.
RULE: Laws 1879, c. 14, section 29, subd. 4t pro­
vides that inhabitants qualified to vote at a district meet­
ing may vote for a site for a schoolhouse. By subdivision 5 
they may vote a tax to purchase or lease such a site. By 
section $6 it is made the duty of the district "to purchase 
or lease such site for a schoolhouse as shall have been 
designated by the voters at a district meeting," and to 
build such a schoolhouse as the voters of the district shall 
have agreed upon.
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DECISION: The power to acquire a site for a school­
house is vested exclusively in the voters of the district, 
and the board have no independent authority whatever.
Judgment for the defendants affirmed.
( b) Petersburg School District of Nelson
County V. Peterson. ( 1905) 105 N. W. 756 ( 11*. N. D.
344)
FACTS : The defendant appealed from a Judgment that
certain described lands belonging to him be condemned as a 
schoolhouse site upon payment of damages to him. The school 
board had called a meeting of the voters of the district to 
vote upon the selection and purchase of a site as provided 
in section 701, Rev. Codes 1899. At this meeting a majority 
of votes %/as cast in favor of a site described as follows: 
"For locating a new schoolhouse on the hill at the south end 
of Sixth Street, in Peterson * s field." The school board met 
later and fixed the description of the land precisely.
The appellant, however, contended that the voters of 
the school district had not selected a definite site. That 
the wording ( as set forth in the above paragraph) was too 
indefinite, and therefore insufficient on which to base con­
demnation proceedings.
RULE: Under Section 701, Rev. Codes 1899, voters of
a school district are required only to select a school site 
by a general designation, and not by definite description.
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DECISION ; Affirmed for plaintiffs.
(c) Iverson v. Williams School District. 
(1919) 172 N. w. 818 (I4.2 N, D. 622)
This action Is an appeal from an order denying the 
plaintiff’s motion for an injunction to restrain performance 
of certain contracts entered into between the defendant 
school district and certain contractors, looking toward the 
construction of a new school building.
FACTS : The school board of the district held a
special meeting at which it was decided to call a special 
election to vote upon the question of consolidating all the 
schools of the district, to select a building site for a 
central school, and to provide a suitable building. The 
election was duly held, and the majority vote was in the 
affirmative. However, the plaintiffs later brought action 
on the grounds that the ballot did not give sufficient in­
formation regarding the selection of building site and the 
amount of the proposed new building. Their contention was 
true. The board had held a later election, however, at 
which they had given specific information on the ballot.
The plaintiffs contended that the first election invalidated 
the succeeding election because the people had actually not, 
even originally, voted for a building nor a site. The 
board, however, had taken action on the proposals; and the 
plaintiffs moved for an injunction to restrain performance
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of certain contracts entered into by the school district.
In the subsequent election, also, the voters had 
voted affirmatively in the majority.
RULE: Com. Laws 1913, sections 1185, 1185, and 1190,
and Laws 1915, c. 127, authorize the question of building 
new buildings to be determined exclusively by the voters in 
the common school districts...also the questions of consoli­
dation of schools, and the selection of sites is to be de­
termined exclusively by the voters.
DECIS1Œ: Where an election results in a failure to
select a site for a schoolhouse by reason of indefiniteness 
of the question submitted, and the question is again sub­
mitted, resulting in the selection of the site previously 
assumed to have been legally selected, the previous invalid 
selection is ratified. An injunction here would perform no 
useful purpose.
Affirmed for defendants.
Key 69. Change of site.
(a) Torgerson et al. v . Golden Va 1lev
School Pi st. No. 85 of Wi 1liams County et al. ( 1919)
171 N. W. 626 (i|2 N. D. 5)
This action is one involving the validity of an elec­
tion held in the defendant school district fbr the purpose of 
changing the location of the consolidated school therein.
FACTS : Under the authority of section 1190, Compiled
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Laws of 1913, an election was held on August 1, 1917, re­
sulting in the consolidation of the schools participating, 
and the site of the consolidated school was determined to be , 
a site already owned by the district near the village of 
Temple. In the month of May following, a petition was pre­
sented to the school board, signed by more than one-third of 
the electors of the district, asking that an election be 
called to submit the question asking for the removal or 
change of site of the consolidated school from the village 
of Temple to a site in section 16 in the same township. In 
pursuance of the petition, an election was held, at which a 
majority voted in favor of the site in section l6. Majority 
less than required.
QUESTION ; Is the last election legal?
RULE; Where a consolidated school is formed and a 
site selected by the electors of the district, acting under 
section 1190, Compiled Laws of 1913, such school csmnot be 
removed without a two-thirds vote of the electors, proceed­
ing under sections 118b. and 1185 of the Compiled Laws of 
1913.
DECISION ; Judgment for plaintiffs affirmed.
(b) Dei de et a^ v. Antelope School Di strict
No. 7 of Stark County et al. ( 1920) 173 N. W. QI[P
»
(b4 N. D. 256)
This is an action to restrain and enjoin the
«
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defendant from moving what is known as schoolhouse No. 1, 
located within the school district in question, from its 
present location to Antelope, which is about one-half mile 
distant from the present location.
FACTS ; The school board called an election for the 
specific purpose of voting upon the removal of a schoolhouse 
from present site to another definite location, which was 
named in the resolution. The notice of the election did not 
state the purpose of the election in accordance with the 
resolution of the school board and the provision in section 
118$, Compiled Laws 1913.
RULE: Section 1185 of the Ccmpiled Laws of 1913 con­
tains the following with reference to the notices of elec­
tion: "Three notices of the time, place and purpose of such
election shall be posted in three of the most public places 
in the district at least fourteen days prior to such meet­
ing."
DECISION: The notice of election was insufficient...
that the election held in pursuance of such invalid notice 
was i nvalid.
Judgment for the appellants (plaintiffs).
(c) Barnes et al v, Meehan et al. ( 1927)
212 N. W. 856 (55 N. D. 22k)
This action arose out of the contesting of an elec­
tion which was held for the purpose of voting on the
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question of moving a schoolhouse from one location to 
another within the district.
FACTS : For our purposes, it is necessary to merely
state that the school election was contested because there 
was evidence that it was not satisfactorily conducted or 
supervised.
A restraining order was issued by the Judge of the 
district restraining the defendants from moving the school­
house from its present location during the pendency of the 
contest and until the further order of the court.
The contest proceeding was begun under section IOI4.6 
of the Compiled Laws of 19I3 .
RULE ; Section IOI4.6 of the Compiled Laws of 1913 pro­
vides for instituting election contests by notice. The sec­
tion, however, is designed to give the right of contest to 
persons "claiming the right to hold an office, or an elector 
of the proper county desiring to contest the validity of an 
election..." Nowhere in the article is there any provision 
referring to contests of school elections upon the proposi­
tion for the removal of schoolhouses.
DECISION : Contest by notice is a statutory proceed­
ing, and may only be resorted to in those instances where it 
has been authorized.
#Judgment for defendants affirmed.
7 0. Purchase or hiring.
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(a) Pronovost v. Brunette. (1917) 162
N. W. 300 (36 N. D. 288)
(See brief of this case in Key 55.)
Supplementary holding to above case:
Under Compiled Laws 1913» sections 1171k, 1 l8ik, where 
a common school district owns school building adequate to 
its needs, and there are not nine school children residing 
two and one-half miles therefr<m for whom additional accom­
modations are needed, district has no authority to lease 
another building and remove school thereto.
Key 71. Construction.
(a) Iverson v. Wi lliams School District.
(For case brief, see Key 68.)
Selection of school sites held determinable exclu­
sively by voters within the common school district.
Key 72. Control and use.
No cases for North Dakota.
Key 73. Care, maintenance, and repair.
Liability for tort, see post. Key 89.
Key 7I4.. ^ale or other disposition.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 7 5. School furniture, books, apparatus, and 
other appliances.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 7 6 . School libraries.
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No cases In North Dakota.
Key 77. Contracts.
No cases for North Dakota.
Key 7 8. Capacity of district to contract in general.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 79* Powers of district or other board officers.
(a) Capital Bank of St. Paul v. School 
Di st. No. g3 of Barnes County. ( I8 90) î 8 N. W, 363
( 1 N. D. 14.7 9)
FACTS ; The minutes of a district school meeting dis­
closed that a motion was carried to build a schoolhouse, a 
tax levied for that purpose, and the school board was ap­
pointed as a building committee, but it did not appear that 
the meeting selected a site or directed the erection of any 
buiIding.
RULE : Laws 1879, c. II4., section $6, provide that the
board shall purchase or lease such site as shall have been 
designated by the school meeting, and shall build such 
schoolhouse as the voters in the district meeting shall have 
agreed upon.
DECISION ; The proceedings at the school meeting did 
not authorize the board to build a schoolhouse.
( b) Ellingson v. Cherry Lake School Dis- 
trict. (1927) 212 N. W. 773 (55 N. D. 141)
FACTS ; In May, 1926, the board of directors of the
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defendant school district published a notice for bids for 
certain improvements of schoolhouse No, I4. in the district.
The then condition of the schoolhouse and the proposed im­
provements are described as follows in the affidavit :
"That the schoolhouse to be remodelled was con­
structed in 19lit-, and when built itwas approved,. .The inside 
ceiling (now) is not in good repair, and the building is 
rather cold*
"The outside toilets are also in bad repair and will 
have to be rebuilt...
"...and contract let for the remodeling of said 
building provides for a basement under the schoolhouse, a 
furnace, inside toi lets,..a cistern in the basement, with a 
f1 Iter..."
A statement of contemplated improvements continues.
QUESTION : Is the plaintiff correct in his contention
that the contract in this case provides for remodeling and 
alteration, and that the school board have no authority to 
enter into such a contract unless they are authorized to do 
so by a vote of the electors of the district?
RULE; The board of a common school district may con­
tract to remodel the schoolhouse to provide for heating, 
water supply, and toilet facilities without submitting the 
proposition to a vote. (Compiled Laws 1913, sections 1173,
1 1 7 5 ,  l lS l j . ,  1 1 8 6 )
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Key 80. Making, requisites,, and validity.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 80 (1). In general.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 80 (2). Proposals or bids.
( a ) Rosatti v. Common Schoo1 Pis trict
No. Cass County. ( 1925) 20li. N. W. 833 (52 N. D.
931)
FACTS ; That the plaintiff, an architect, entered 
into an express contract with the defendant whereby the 
former performed professional services as an architect in 
the preparation of plans, general drawings, and specifica­
tions, and made preliminary studies for the construction of 
a school for the defendant ; that the agreed value for such 
services was the sum of $1,557.50; that the defendant, a 
common school corporation, refused to pay on the grounds 
that, in the exercise of the powers granted to school 
boards, such boards are limited by the provisions of sec­
tion 1259, C. L, 1913* which reads in part :
"No expenditure involving an amount greater than one 
hundred dollars shall be made except in accordance with the 
provisions of a written contract, and no contract involving 
an expenditure of more than five hundred dollars for the 
purpose of erecting any public buildings or making any im­
provements shall be made except upon sealed proposals and to
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the lowest responsible bidder, after public notice for four­
teen days previous to receiving such bids."
RULE: By the amendment of section 1356, chapter 266,
S. L. 1911, contracts for professional services were excepted 
from the requirement that contracts for the expenditure of 
school funds be let only after advertising for proposals and 
to the lowest responsible bidder.
DECISION: Affirmed for the plaintiff.
(b) Ellinoson v. Cherry Lake School
District.
For brief, see ante Key 79, Case (b).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
"Responsible," as in "lowest responsible bidder," in­
cludes integrity, skill, ability, and capacity to perform 
particular work ( C o t i p . Laws 1913* section 1356).
(c) SJt. Paul Foundry Co. v. Burnstad School 
Dist. No. 21. ( 1936) 269 N. W. 738 (67 N. D. 61)
FACTS : The defendants, a public school corporation,
set out to build a gymnasium after rejecting as too high the 
bids that had been submitted. Before finally proceeding to 
build they published no further advertisement for bids, 
either for general construction or for material or labor.
It procured structural steel from the plaintiff. So far as
the records of the school district show, no contract with
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the plaintiff was authorized or entered into by the defend­
ant district or the school board thereof. But it procured 
the steel. Thereafter, on January 2 3, 1930, the warrant in 
suit was issued in the amount of $732,03 in payment of the 
bill to plaintiff. The warrant was registered and noted as 
not paid for want of funds. Plaintiff sued to recover 
amount of the warrant.
Defendant defends on ground that the warrant is void 
because it was Issued in payment of the purchase price of 
certain material used in the construction of a school build­
ing, which said material was purchased Illegally and without 
first advertising for bids as required by statute.
DECISION : Statute requiring competitive bidding in
letting contracts Involving expenditure of school funds he Id 
not repealed by implication by subsequent statute requiring 
ccanpetitive bidding in letting contracts for repair work in 
excess of $3,000, which provided for repeal of all conflict­
ing acts, since there was no irreconcilable inconsistency 
(Comp. Laws 1913, section 1356; Laws 1929, c . 195).
The question here is not as to whether the plaintiff 
can recover the property obtained from it by the defendant 
or the reasonable value thereof. The plaintiff seeks to 
recover the contractual purchase price.
Affirmed for defendant. Contract for purchase of 
steel used in building school gymnasium entered into without
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observing mandatory provisions of statute requiring competi­
tive bidding for letting such contracts held invalid.
Key 01, Contractors' bonds.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 8l (1). Bonds of textbook publishers.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 81 (2). Bonds of contractors for construction of 
schoolhouses.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 82. Unauthorized or illegal contracts.
(a) Capital Bank of St. Paul v. School 
Dist. No. 55 of Barnes County.
For brief, see ante Key 79, Case (a).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
"Laws Dak. 18?9, c. 1̂ ., section 29» gives the school 
district meeting power 'to vote a tax annually, not exceed­
ing one per cent of the taxable property...to purchase or 
lease a site, and to build, hire, or purchase a school 
house.' Section 56 provides that the school board shall 
build, purchase, or lease a school house 'out of the funds 
provided for that purpose.' He Id that the school meeting 
could not authorize a contract for a schoolhouse for an 
amount exceeding the funds on hand and the annual tax of 
one per cent actually levied, and the use of the house by
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the district created no liability either under the contract 
or for the value received,"
Further : A contract, authorized by the inhabitants
of a school district at a district meeting, to build a 
schoolhouse for an amount in excess of funds on hand or 
subject to collection for that purpose and the amount that 
could be realized from the maximum tax which could be levied 
by the inhabitants for the current year and used for that 
purpose, is void.
Key 82 (2). Ratification of contracts.
(a) Capita 1 Bank of St. Fau1 v. Schoo1 
Di st. No. ^3 of Barnes County.
See preceding case.
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
"A contract to build schoolhouse for an amount in ex­
cess of funds available, void because the district board had 
no authority to make it, could not be made binding upon the 
district by subsequent ratification by the inhabitants."
( b ) Gi1lesple v , Common Schoo 1 District 
N o . 6, McClean County.
For brief, see ante Key 55» Case (c).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
"Contract of school directors with architect to draw
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plans of building, invalid for irregularities, held binding 
on the district through subsequent ratification,"
Further ; "Contract by school directors, not binding 
on district for irregularities, may became binding by sub­
sequent ratification if contract was within power of dis­
trict and might lawfully be made when executed." (Also 
ruled in case following.)
( c) Paul Foundry Co, v. Burnstad School
District No. j_l.
For brief, see ante Key 80 (2), Case (c).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
Refer to final paragraph ruling above from Gillespi e 
V, Common School District No. 8, McClean County.
Further : "When school district warrant was unen­
forceable because of failure to observe requirement of com­
petitive bidding, school district officers* subsequent 
recognition of validity of warrant held not such ratifica­
tion as would make enforceable where there was at no time 
any attempt to comply with statutory requirements for com­
petitive bidding,"
Key 8 3, Implied contracts.
(a) Henderson v. Long Creek School Di st.
m
No. 2 of Divide County.
For brief, see ante Key 67* Case (d).
#
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Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
"In view of Comp. Laws 1913# section 118̂ _, where 
board of a common school district, who had not obtained 
requisite authority, refused to contract for construction 
of schoolhouse, the district was not liable upon contract 
by its acceptance of a building so constructed without 
authority,"
Key 81̂ . Construction and operation.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key Modification and reel si on: .
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 85. Performance or breach,
(a) Kasbo Const. Co. v, Minto School Di st, 
of Cavalier County, ( 1921) iQl̂  N. W, 1029 (i;8 
N. D. i|̂ 3)
FACTS : Plaintiff’s action is to recover the balance
claimed to be due under the terms of a written contract, and 
for extras alleged to have been furnished for the construe- 
tion of a schoolhouse. The defendant interposed a defense 
to the effect that the building was not constructed in ac­
cordance with the terms of the contract, plans, nor specifi­
cations; that the workmanship was poor, etc. The evidence 
abundantly established that the building was not constructed 
according to specifications, and that it was very defective.
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After completion of the schoolhouse, the defendant school 
district used the building, and the plaintiff thereupon con­
tended that the district had accepted possession of the 
buiIding,
RULE; (1) Where a building contract was defectively 
performed. If the defects were irremediable, the contractor 
was not entitled to recover, but, if remediable, he was en­
titled to recover the contract price plus proved extras 
which ought to be paid for, less the amount necessary to 
remedy defects.
(2) In an action against a district for balance of 
constructing a schoolhouse, where there was no other place 
where a school could be held, so that the defendant was com­
pelled to use the defective building, by doing so it waived 
none of its claims or causes of action for defective con­
struction.
Judgment affirmed for defendant.
Key 86, Remedies of parties.
Key 86 (1). Contracts for textbooks.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 86 (2). Contracts for construction or equipment 
of schoolhouses.
(a) Henderson v. Long Creek School Di st.
No. 2, Divide County.
For brief and decision, see ante Key 6?, Case (d).
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( b) BarteIson v. Internat i ona1 SchooI Di st.
No. Portai Township. (1919) 171& N. W. 78 ( W
N. D. 2 5 3)
(Because of the unusual nature of this case--its cir­
cumstances and the decision deriving from it--it shall be 
set forth at some length from the opinion of one of the 
Supreme Court Judges who reviewed it, and who entered judg­
ment reversing the trial court Judgment, which held for the 
plaintiff.)
This is an action where it is sought to recover the 
amount due a contractor for the construction of a school 
building, in excess of the constitutional debt limit, by re­
quiring the school district to return the property received 
or be declared a trustee for the use or rental value there­
of, and where it appears that the building cannot be re­
turned, or any part thereof segregated, without destruction 
or loss of property of the municipality, and that no burden 
can be imposed upon the municipality without exceeding the 
debt limit.
FACTS ; In May, 1913, pursuant to an election, so 
authorizing, the board of education made a contract with the 
plaintiff to erect a high school building for the contract 
price of $214.,0 0 0. Accordingly the building was constructed, 
and its value, as stipulated, since ccmpletion is $3 0,0 0 0. 
The plaintiff has received $19,769.10. There is a balance
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due and unpaid of $14.,290.90, with interest.
In 1914 an action to enjoin the school district, its 
officers, and the plaintiff herein was instituted by a resi­
dent taxpayer of the district to enjoin further issuance or 
reception of warrants in payment of outstanding warrants for 
the construction of such building. In that case (Anderson 
V. International School Di strict —  see post Key 90, Case ( b)) 
this court, in November held that the contract created a 
present debt against the district, greatly in excess of the 
constitutional debt limit, and that to the extent of such 
excess the contracts were void, and enjoined further pay­
ments thereon.
The sole question involved...is the right of the 
plaintiff in equity, upon the facts, to obtain relief for 
the amount unpaid and due him.
Equity properly recognizes that a municipal corpora­
tion should not be permitted to take the property of 
another, and receive the benefits thereof, and thus be en­
riched through the loss of another, without compensation.
On the other hand, constitutional limitations upon 
the creation of indebtedness of municipalities are mandatory 
restrictions, enacted for the purpose of curbing taxing 
power and of restraining excessive expenditures, that entail 
tax burdens. It is well settled that those who deal with 
municipalities are bound to take notice and be bound by
«
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these constitutional restrictions.
RULE; Accordingly, it must be recognized that, in 
applying equitable relief in the present form of action, 
equity must not accomplish by indirection what the law has 
prescribed must not be done directly.
DECISION ; Judgment reversed in favor of defendant.
(c) Kasbo Const. Co. v, Minto School Dis- 
trict of Caval1er County.
For brief, see ante Key 85, Case (a).
Key 87-8 8. District expenses and charges, and 
liabilities specially imposed by statute.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 8 9. Torts.
( a ) Anderson v . Board of Education of City 
of Fargo. ( 1922) 190 N. W. 807 ( î-9 N. D. I8 I)
FACTS ; Plaintiff brought an action against the de­
fendant, charging it in her complaint with negligence in 
establishing and maintaining upon its school playgrounds 
certain apparatus, consisting of several heavy swings and 
chutes, more particularly described in the complaint, and in 
appropriate language alleging that her son, while on the 
school playgrounds, by reason of such negligence was injured 
and killed. She claimed damages in the sum of $25,000, and 
in addition thereto $200 to cover burial expenses of the boy 
and for physician’s fees.
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RUIÆ: The board of education of the city of Fargo,
a body corporate by virtue of a special law approved March 14., 
1885, as amended, authorizing such board to provide such ap­
paratus as is necessary for the physical improvement and 
health of the pupils, in providing heavy swings and chutes 
on a school playground acted in a purely governmental capa­
city, and was not subject to a suit, either In action for 
damages or otherwise for the death of a pupil injured and 
killed when struck by an iron-barred swing seat in operation 
on the school playgrounds,
DECISION : Judgment affirmed for defendant.
«
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CHAPTER VII 
DISTRICT DEBTS, SECURITIES, AND TAXATION
Key 90. Power to incur Indebtedness and expenditures.
(a) Farmers * and Merchants * National Bank 
of Vallev City v. School Di strict No. ^3.
For brief, see ante Key 68, Case (a ).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
"Laws 1879, c. 14> restricts the amount of obliga­
tions a school district may incur in any one year to 1^ per 
cent on the value of the taxable property in the district. 
Held that warrants payable immediately, for sums exceeding 
such percentage, are invalid."
(b) Anderson v. Internat!onal School Dis- 
trict No. St Portal Township. ( 1916) 1^6 N. W. Sk- 
(3 2 N. D. 14.13)
FACTS : Defendant school district, whose debt limit
was about $16,000, entered into a contract on May 27, 1913, 
with defendant BarteIson for the erection of a schoolhouse 
at the agreed price of $2lj.,000. Eighty-five per cent of 
the labor and materials furnished was payable monthly upon 
estimates of the architect, and the balance within a short 
time after the completion of the building, which was to be 
ccmipleted on or before October 15, 1913, entered into two
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other contrectSÿ one for heeting and ventilating the build­
ing, and the other for lighting it, which called for addi­
tional payments on the completion thereof.
RULE; (1) In Const. section 183, limiting to five 
per cent the debt of school districts, the word "debt" in­
cludes liabilities created under executory contracts for 
public improvements, though nothing is due thereon until 
same are executed in part or in whole.
(2 ) In determining whether the five per cent limit 
on indebtedness, prescribed by Const, section I8 3, has been 
exceeded, funds in the school district’s treasury available 
for meeting its liabilities and also taxes levied and uncol­
lected may be considered, but the district officers cannot 
anticipate revenues from future levies.
DECISIGN ; He Id that these contracts created a 
present debt against the district at the date they were 
entered into, which debt, after deducting available funds in 
the treasury applicable to the payment thereof, greatly ex­
ceeded the constitutional debt limit, and to the extent of 
such excess the contracts are void, and further payments 
thereon are enjoined.
(c) Rosatti V, Common School District No.
9 6 , Cass County.
For brief, see ante Key 80 (2), Case (a).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this
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section» as follows:
(1) Comp. Laws 1913» section 1259, relating to ex­
penditure of school money, being part of article 9 , c. 12, 
dealing with special school districts, is limitation on 
powers of boards of education of special school districts 
only, and does not apply to common school district boards, 
sections 1173-1207 dealing with powers and duties of common 
school boards.
(2) Comp. Laws 1913, section 1356, included in c. 12, 
and restricting expenditure of school money is a statute of 
general application, and, unless otherwise provided, oper­
ates to circumscribe powers of all school boards, including 
those of common school districts, regardless of sections 
1184, 1185, relating to powers of such districts.
(d) J ones v . Bri ghtwood Independent School 
District No. ( 1933) 2^7 N. W. 884 (63 N. D. 275)
FACTS : Plaintiffs sought to enjoin the defendants
from levying taxes to pay certain warrants and bonds Issued 
by Bri ghtwood independent school district No. 1, Rich land 
County, Plaintiffs further alleged that defendants arc 
paying Illegal debts, are threatening to continue illegal 
and excessive tax levies, and will do so unless enjoined.
RULE: Resident taxpayers seeking to enjoin school
district from levying taxes to pay outstanding indebtedness, 
some of which was clearly legal, must differentiate between
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lega 1 and illegal indebtedness, and establish amount there­
of.
DECISION : Judgment affirmed for defendants.
( e) Knudson v. Norm am School District
No. — , Traill County. ( 1934) 256 N. W. 224 (64
N. D. 779)
Not pertinent to this study.
(f) State V. Rasmusson. County Auditor.
( 1941) 300 N. W. 25 (71 N. 0. 267)
See post Key 100, Case (a).
Key 91, Constitutional and statutory provisions.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 92. Administration of finances in general.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 92 (1). Custody and disbursement of funds.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 92 (2)-94. No titles listed.
Key 95. Warrants, orders, and certificates of in­
debtedness.
Action against officers issuing order, see ante Key
62.
Key 95(1). In general.
(a) Farmers' and Merchants * National Bank 
of Valley City v. School District No. 53.
For brief see ante Key 6 8, Case (a). Also for
#
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additional ruling see same case in Key 90, Case (a).
Ruling pertinent to this Key section, as follows: 
"Where the statute, section 29, subd. l|., c. lî . Laws 
1879, required that the voters of a school district should 
select a site for a schoolhouse, and the district board, 
without this having first been done, selected it, built a 
house and issued warrants therefor without the authority 
and ratification of the voters, he Id the warrants were void 
...where there was a restriction on the amount of revenue a 
school district might raise in any one year, and a board in 
issuing certain warrants payable immediately, exceeded this 
limit, held, the warrants were void."
Key 95 (2). Issuance, requisites and validity.
(a) Goose River Bank v. Wi 11 iston Lake 
School Township. ( 1890) W 4. N. W. 1002 (1 N. D. 26)
FACTS : The action was upon three school township
warrants issued by the officers of the defendant. They were 
issued to pay for the services of a teacher who held no law­
ful certificate of qualification.
RULE: Every contract relating to the employment of a
teacher who does not hold a lawful certificate of qualifica­
tion is void by the express terms of the statute ( section 
1723, Comp, Laws), and every warrant Issued in payment of 
services of such teacher Is without consideration and void, 
DECI SION : The teacher had no claim against the
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dëfend&nt, b6C3>use the statute declares she should not have 
been employed to teach, and every act in violation of this 
provision was a nullity, so far as the liability of the de­
fendant is concerned. The plaintiff cannot claim protection 
as innocent purchaser for value. That such instruments are 
not negotiable in the sense that their negotiation will cut 
off defenses is the voice of all decisions.
Judgment affirmed in favor of defendant.
(b) Crane and Ordwav Co. v. Svkeston School 
District No. 11. (1917) 162 N. W. î.13 (3 6 N. D. 2^)
FACTS ; This action arises out of a contractor's in­
ducing a board of directors of a school district to issue a 
district warrant by making false representations as to the 
payment for materials used in the performance of a contract 
between such contractor and the district. The contractor's 
representation that all materials and labor had been paid 
for was false.
RULE: Where contractor induces directors of a school
district to issue a warrant by false representations as to 
payment for material used under a contract with district, 
warrant may be rescinded, and contractor be required to sur­
render it for cancellation.
( c ) Osage Farmers National Bank v. Van Hook 
Special School District No. 8 . { 1935) 263 N. W. l62
( 66 N. D. 196)
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FACTS : Plaintiff brought this action to recover on
certain warrants alleged to have been issued by the defend­
ant school district. All the warrants involved in. this case 
were presented to the treasurer of the defendant school dis­
trict for payment either on the day on which they were 
issued or within three days afterward. The warrants were 
endorsed by the school treasurer as provided by law to the 
effect that they had been presented for payment and not paid 
for vrant of funds. Six years later the plaintiff commenced 
this action, and the defendant contended that the rights and 
causes of action were barred by the statute of limitations,
RULE ; In these circumstances the statute of limita­
tions did not commence to run until the warrants were called 
for payment and notice given to the holder as required by 
law,
DECISION: Judgment affirmed for plaintiff,
( d) Paul Foundry Co, v. Burnstad School
Dist, No. 31.
For brief, see ante Key 80 (2), Case (c).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
"Warrant issued by school district in payment of 
obligation arising out of contract which was invalid for 
failure to observe statutory provision requiring ccanpetitive 
bidding held unenforceable, since the warrant created no
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greater liability than the debt it represented."
Key 95 (3). Negotiability and transfer.
( a) Goose River Bank v. Wi1 low Lake School
To%mshlp.
For brief, see ante Key 95 (2 ), Case (a).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
(1) Warrants for the payment of a t eacher * s services 
are not negotiable so as to cut off defenses, and an assigiee 
cannot recover thereon as being a bona fide purchaser.
(2) School township warrants are not negotiable in­
struments, in the sense that their negotiation will cut off 
defenses existing against them in the hands of the payee.
(b) Capital Bank of St. Paul v. School
District No.
For brief, see ante Key 79, Case Ca).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
A warrant issued by a school district, though in the 
hands of a bona fide purchaser, creates no greater liability 
than the demand represents, and it is subject to the same 
defenses.
Key 95 ( if.). Payment.
(a) School District No. 35 of Cass County
V. Shinn.
*
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For brief, see ante Key 63 (3), Case ( b).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
School treasurer is ministerial officer without dis­
cretion respecting payment of warrants properly drawn and 
signed (Comp. Laws 1913, sections II6 I, 1168, 1173).
Key 95 (5)* Rights and remedies of holders.
(a) Capital Bank of St. Pau 1 v. School 
District No. 63 of Barnes County.
For brief, see ante Key 79, Case (a).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
A warrant creates no greater liability than the debt 
it represents, whether in the hands of the original party or 
of a purchaser before maturity and for value.
(b) Crane and Ordway Co. v, Sykeston School 
Dist. No. 11.
For brief, see ante Key 96 (2), Case (b).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
That members of a school board have disbursed funds 
in payment of individual Judgments against them for material 
supplied to the district does not prevent them from defend­
ing an action on a school district warrant which had been 
obtained by fraud.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
103
( c ) Osage Farmers National Bank v. Van Hook 
Special School District No. 8 .
For brief, see ante Key 95 (2 ), Case (c).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
Where payment of school district warrant was refused 
on presentment for want of funds, indorsement to such effect 
was made on warrant by school district treasurer and warrant 
was registered in treasurer's books, limitation did not com­
mence to run until warrant was called for payment and notice 
given to holder to present warrant for payment.
Key 9 6 . Bills and notes.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 97. Bonds,
See Key 97 (1) immediately following.
Key 97 (1). Authority to issue bonds in general.
(a) Prairie School v. Hase leu.
For brief, see ante Key 6 3, Case (a).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
Laws 1883, c. -̂5, section 1, provides that school 
township bonds shall be signed by the township clerk and 
director. Section 2 provides that all moneys received from 
the sale of the bonds shall be paid to the treasurer. He Id
that the treasurer has no authority as such to issue or
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sell bonds.
(b) Schouweller v. A1 len. ( 1908) 11?
N. W. 866 ( 17 N. D. 510)
FACTS : After a majority of the voters of a school
district had instructed the school board to issue bonds for 
building purposes, a taxpayer and voter of the district 
brouÿit suit to enjoin the issuance of the bonds voted, 
alleging that enough illegal votes were cast in favor of 
the bonds to change the result.
The school board answered, denying all allegations of 
the complaint relating to illegal votes ; but subsequently a 
majority of the board stipulated personally with the plain­
tiff in such action that Judgment should be rendered and 
entered in favor of the plaintiff permanently enjoining the 
defendants from issuing the bonds so voted.
Held that such stipulation constitutes collusion be­
tween the plaintiff and the officers, and a legal fraud upon 
the district and the court.
RULE ; The officers of a school district are in 
effect agents of the voters and taxpayers, and when the dis­
trict, at a regularly called and conducted election, votes 
to issue the bonds of the district and from the proceeds to 
build a schoolhouse, such vote is an instruction by the 
principal, and such officers have no discretion as to obey­
ing instructions.
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Ke^ 97 (2 ). Funding indebtedness.
( a) State v. School Dist. No. 90 of Barnes 
County. ( 1909) 120 N. W. 555 ( 18 N. D. 6 l6 )
FACTS AND RULE : The municipal bonds of defendant
school district which are sued upon in this case were issued 
without first submitting to the electors of the school dis­
trict the question of their issuance* and, furthermore, the 
school district had no power to issue the same by the ex­
press provisions of the act under which it is claimed they 
were issued as there were not 25 legal votes cast in such 
district at the preceding annual school election therein. 
Chapter 11, p. 39, Laws 1887, under which the plaintiff con­
tends such bonds were issued, is printed upon the back of 
the bonds, and section 9 thereof expressly provides that the 
question of refunding prior indebtedness shall be first sub­
mitted to a vote of the qualified voters of the district 
after giving certain notice therein prescribed of an elec­
tion for such purpose, and that the proposition to issue 
such bonds must receive the affirmative votes of at least 
two-thirds of all the votes cast ; also that no school dis­
trict in which less than 25 legal votes were cast at the 
annual school election next preceding the issuance of such 
bonds shall avail itself of the provisions of this act.
DECISICN ; Judgment affirmed for defendant. He Id. 
that such bonds are void.
*
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Key 97 (3)- Limitation of amount of bonds.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 97 (U). Submission of question of issue to 
popular vote.
(a) Shouwei1er v, A1 len.
For brief, see ante Key 97 (1), Case (b).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
Rev. Codes 190$, section 911, providing that if a 
majority of all the votes cast at a school district election 
shall be in favor of issuing bonds, the school board, through 
its proper officers, shall forthwith issue the bonds, is 
mandatory.
(b) Shir1ey v. Coal Field School Dist. No.
16, Divide County. ( 1920) 179 N. W. 5$1 (I4.6 N. D.
51)
FACTS ; This is an action to enjoin school officials 
from issuing school bonds approved by the voters at a spe­
cial election, where the complaint alleges active fraud and 
fraudulent design on the part of the school officials in the 
calling of such election, the posting of notices thereof, 
and in the t ime when the same was held for the purpose of 
preventing an expression by the majority of the voters in 
the di strlet...the clerk of the district did, however, post 
notices of such election, viz., one at the post office, one
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at. the village hall, one at the town pump house, and one at 
the schoolhouse, all In the village of Noonan.
RULE: In a special election to vote upon an issue of
school bonds pursuant to section 1333, Comp. Laws 1913, 
notices thereof posted in at least three public and conspic­
uous places in the school district comply with the statute. 
It is not essential that such notices be posted upon the 
bulletin boards or places designated pursuant to section 
k2Li.8, Comp. Laws 1913.
DECISION : Judgment affirmed for defendants.
( c) Knudson v . Norman School District,
Trai11 County.
Not pertinent to this study.
Key 97 (k'k)» Proceedings to determine validity of
bonds.
Key 97 (5). Sale or other disposition of bonds by 
district.
Key 97 (6). Form, execution, and issuance of bonds.
(a) Schouwei1er v. A1 len.
For brief see ante Key 97 (1), Case (b). Rule 
applies also to this Key section.
(b) State V .  School Di strict N o .  50 of 
Barnes County.
For brief, see ante Key 97 (2), Case (a). Rule 
applies also to this section.
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Key 97 (8). Ratification and estoppel.
( a) State v. School District No. 50 of
Barnes County.
See annotation in (b) above.
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
The bonds in suit contain a recital to the effect that 
they arc issued for the purpose of refunding present indebt­
edness "as authorized by act of the legislative assembly ap­
proved March 11, I8 87," Laws I8 87, p. 39, c. 11, entitled 
"AN act to provide for refunding the outstanding indebted­
ness which existed prior to July 3 0, I8 86, of any incorpor­
ated board of education or school district in the territory 
of Dakota." He Id. that such recital does not estop the 
school district from urging the defense, even as against an 
innocent purchaser, that such bonds were illegally issued.
Key 97 (9). Payment,
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 97 (10). Rights and remedies of holders.
(a) State v. School Pistrlet No. 50 of
Barnes County.
See Rule in Case (a). Key 97 ( 8) above.
Key 9 8 . School taxes.
Key 99. Power and duty to tax.
(a) Jones v, Br1qhtwood Independent School
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District No. 1.
For brief, see ante Key 22, Case ( d).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
General statute regarding school district tax levies 
he Id applicable to school district organized by act of ter­
ritorial Legislature. Comp. Laws Supp. 192$, sections 2079- 
bl to 2079-bl3.
Key 100. Purposes and grounds.
(a) State v. Rasmus son. ( 191̂ .1) 300 N. W.
25 (71 N. D. 267)
FACTS : This is an action by plaintiff to command the
defendant to levy and extend against certain property taxes 
to pay school's bond issue in fall.
RULE: The statute requiring that a tax sufficient to
pay bonds be levied upon taxable property in school district 
must be read into the school bond contract.
D E C I S I : Affirmed for defendant.
(b) State v. School Dist. No. 50, Barnes
County.
For brief, see ante 97 (2), Case (a).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
A recital in school district bonds that they were 
issued to refund present indebtedness as authorized by Act
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March 11, l88? (Laws 188?, p. 39, c, 11), does not stop the 
district from urging the defense, even against an innocent 
purchaser, that the bonds were Illegally issued.
( c ) Payne v. Board of Trustees of the
Teachers * Ins. and Retirement Fund. ( 19ii-8) 35 N. W.
2d 553 (72 N. D. 278)
FACTS ; The plaintiff, William H, Payne, had been 
engaged in teaching in the public schools for twenty-six 
years, eighteen of which, including the last five years of 
such service, were in the public schools of North Dakota and 
in equivalent service of the army. He completed the pay­
ments of the assessments at the end of the school year 1945- 
46 but lacked one year of teaching in North Dakota. He com­
pleted such teaching service in the state about May 31,
1947; he was fifty-nine years old. On August 27, 1947, he 
wrote to the executive secretary of the Board and applied 
for retirement under the provisions of Senate Bill 103 as 
passed by the 1947 Legislature.
Senate Bill 103 became Chapter 165, S. L . 1047, Sec. 
15-3928, 1947 Supp. NDRC 1943» The Board refused to grant 
the annuity provided by that chapter on the grounds that the 
plaintiff had performed no teaching services after it became 
effective. The Board pointed out that he was entitled to 
payments under the old law. Plaintiff then brought this 
suit to determine and enforce his claimed rights under the
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19̂4-7 law* Tlic Di st r i ct Court round in his favor and the 
Board brought this appeal.
The stipulated facts show that the plaintiff on May 
31> 1914.7 » had fully complied with the act and fulfilled all 
the conditions therein. By ceasing to teach he retired. He 
was at that time entitled to the deferred payments, in the 
form of an annuity, provided by the Teachers* Insurance and 
Retirement Act, for the services he had performed. It became 
the duty of the Board, as soon as requested, to determine 
the amount of his annuity according to the law then in 
force, and commence payments as of that date.
DECISION : It follows that the plaintiff is only en­
titled to receive annuities under Sec. 15-3928, 1914-7 Supp. 
NDRC 1914.3 .
Judgment of the District Court is reversed in favor 
of defendants, and remanded for further proceedings accord­
ing to law.
Key 101. Amount of tax.
(a) Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Duncan. 
(1919) 176 N. W. 992 ( I42  N. D. 314-6)
FACTS ; The action is one to recover certain taxes 
alleged to have been paid by the plaintiff under protest.
The facts alleged in the complaint may be briefly stated as 
follows: In the year 1915 the county auditor of Towner
County levied a mill tax for school purposes upon the
e
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property of the plaintiff, acting under the authority ex­
pressed in section I22I4., Comp, Laws 1913.
The tax is $111^.69 in excess of the amount which the 
auditor would be authorized to levy under Chapter 2Sl̂  of the 
Session Laws of 191^, if the provisions of this chapter were 
applicable and if the authority contained in section 122î , 
Compiled Laws of 1913, is restricted by the later enactment.
The tax was paid under protest.
RULE ; Session Laws 1915» c . 25̂ 1-» section 1, which 
provides for limiting taxes levied at a certain rate in 
mills during the years 1915- 16, limits the taxes that may be 
extended by the county auditor for school purposes, under 
Comp. Laws 1913» section 122I4..
DECISION ; Judgment affirmed for plaintiff.
(b) State V. Kramer. ( 1922) 190 N. W. 2?1
(I4-9 N. D. 397)
FACTS; The plaintiff and petitioner alleges, among 
other things, that prior to the I5th day of August, 1922, a 
special election was held in Devils Lake special school dis­
trict for the purpose of authorizing a tax levy of 25 per 
cent in excess of the limit otherwise provided by chapter 
122 of the Session Laws of 1921» and that an election held 
on August I5th resulted in a favorable vote on the proposi­
tion; that the board of education thereupon, by resolution, 
directed the levy of $1 7 ,0 0 0 for school purposes, which sum
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was within the 25 per cent increase authorized at the elec­
tion; that upon certification of the levy to the county 
auditor, the latter refused to extend the taxes. Judgment 
was brought in favor of the plaintiff.
RULE: Session Laws 1921, c. 122, providing that the
total amiount of taxes levied for any purpose, except special 
levies for local improvements and maintenance of sinking 
funds in any county or political subdivision, or any vil­
lage, town, or city within the state, shall not exceed any 
amount equal to one-third of the total combined levies which 
were made for the years 1918, 1919, and 1920, except that 
school districts may levy not to exceed 30 per cent in ex­
cess of such amount, and provided that any county or politi­
cal subdivision, or any village, town, or city, may increase 
such levy in same proportion as assessed property valuation 
increases or has increased over that of year 1919, and pro­
vided that the electors may by a majority vote authorize a 
levy of 25 per cent in excess of this limit, held to author­
ize electors of school districts by a majority vote to in­
crease the tax levy above the limit otherwise prescribed.
DECISIŒ: Judgment for plaintiff affirmed.
Cc) Great Northern Rv. Co. v. Severson.
County Treasurer. ( 19S D  50 N. W. 2d 689 (78 N. D.
6 1 0)
FACTS : Plaintiff brought this action to recover
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money paid under protest as excess tax levies. The clerk of 
the school board of the district certified to the County 
Auditor of Nelson County for the year 19ii.6 a levy of 33 
mills, which was the maximum levy established by the elec­
tors of the district at the special election in 19ii-6,
Despite the fact that no other election was held in the dis­
trict, the clerk of the school board, for the year 19̂ .7, 
certified a levy of 50.12 mills, which was ll{..12 mills in 
excess of the 36-mill limitation established by Chapter 359, 
SLND 19U-7- This excess levy applied to valuation of plain­
tiff’s property amounts to $903.85- This amount the plain­
tiff sought to recover. The plaintiff did not contest the 
right of the school district to levy 36 mills as prescribed 
by Chapter 359, SLND 1914-7, but challenges the right of the 
school district to use the right of the 191|-6 election and 
the levy increase approved at that time as a basis for in­
creasing the levy limit prescribed by that statute,
RULE ; The 1914-7 amendatory statute which raised the 
aggregate amount of tax that could be levied by any school 
district giving four years of standard high school work 
from 22 mills to 36 mills is prospective in its operation 
and does not furnish an enlarged basis for applying the per­
centage increase approved by the voters of a school district 
at an election held when the prior levy limit of 22 mills 
was in effect.
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DECISION ; Judgment affirmed for plaintiff.
Key 102. Persons and property liability.
(a) State v, Rasmusson.
For brief, see ante Key 100, Case (a).
Further ruling in case, pertinent to this Key sec­
tion, as follows;
Where territory is detached from one school district 
and organized into a new school district, tax levies by old 
district for debt service do not follow detached territory 
except as directed by an arbitration board under the statute 
providing that the board shall take an account of the 
assets, funds on hands, the debts Justly and properly be­
longing to or chargeable to each corporation, or part of a 
corporation affected by such change, and levy such tax 
against each as will in its judgment justly and fairly 
equalize their several interests.
Key 103. Levy and assessment.
Key 103 (1). Making requisites, and validity in 
genera 1.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 103 (2). Submission of question to voters.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 103 (3). Statement of purpose of tax.
No cases in North Dakota.
103 ( .  Certificates, estimates, and
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determination of rate or amount of levy.
(a) State v. Kramer.
For brief, see ante Key 101, Case (b).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
Session Laws 19IS, c. 11*4, providing that the board 
of education shall, on or before the 20th day of July in 
each year, levy a tax for the support of the schools of the 
corporation for the fiscal year next ensuing, held not ap­
plicable as to the time of certification of the tax to the 
county auditor to an additional tax authorized by the elec­
tors, under Session Laws 1921, c, 122.
Key 104» Lien.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 105. Payment.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 106. Correction and enforcement.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 107. Remedies for erroneous taxation.
(a) Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Mustad, 
County Auditor , et al. ( 194^) 33 N . W. 2d 436
(76 N. D. 84)
FACTS: In this action the plaintiff entered a com­
plaint showing that the school district had levied and ex­
tended against the plaintiff's property an allegedly
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excessive tax on the theory that the vote of the electors of 
the district to exceed the legal tax limit by 50 per cent 
authorized a levy of tax 50 per cent in excess of legal tax 
limit as increased by subsequent legislation, and that the 
defendants had threatened to and would collect such tax if 
not restrained.
HELD : Railroad was not entitled to injunctive re­
straining levy and collection of school district tax on its 
personal property in excess of amount which district was 
authorized to levy in absence of showing that exaction of 
tax would result in irreparable injury to railroad, since 
railroad had an adequate remedy at law by paying tax under 
protest and suing to recover amount of illegal exaction.
Key 108. Assessments and special taxes for particu­
lar purposes.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 109. Poll taxes.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 110. Disposition of proceeds of taxes and other 
revenues.
(a) Stinson v. Thorson. (1916) 158 N. W.
351 (3I4. N. D. 372)
FACTS ; This is an action to restrain the school 
board of Grand Forks independent school district from carry-* 
ing out a contract for the erection of a high school
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building, because certain funds had been diverted from the 
purpose for which they had been levied, and that without 
such funds said contract creates a debt in excess of the 
constitutional limit.
RULE: Transfer of funds from teachers' general fund
of independent school district is not prohibited by Const, 
section 175» relating to application of taxes.
DECISION : Original judgment for plaintiffs is re­
versed.
( b) Gerhardt v. Heid.
For brief and decision, see ante Key 2, Case (a).
Key 111. Rights and remedies of taxpayers.
( a ) Anderson v. International School Dist.
No. Portal Township. Burke County.
For brief, see ante Key 90, Case ( b).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
Payments on contracts of a school district creating 
a debt in excess of the five per cent limit prescribed by 
Const, section l83, will be enjoined at the suit of a tax­
payer.
( b) Kretchmer v. School Board of Di st. No.
12. Barnes County.
For brief, see ante Key 6?, Case ( b),
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
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section, as follows:
Evidence he Id to show establishment and attempt to 
maintain high school by defendants without submission of 
question to popular vote, as required by Comp. Laws 1913* 
section 1192, so that injunction against such section is 
authorized.
(c) Shir lev v. Coal Field School Di st. No. 
16. Divide County.
For brief, see ante Key 97 (2), Case (b).
Identical rule applies to this section.
(d) Weeks v. Hetland. (1925) 202 N. W.
807 (52 N. D. 351)
(e) Beckman v. Bel yea. ( 1931) 236 N. W.
361 (60 N. D. 738)
(f) Moots V. Belyea. ( 193D 236 N. W.
358
FACTS ; These arc ccsnpanion cases. There were four 
schools in the district and four teachers to employ. At the 
time the contract was entered into with Mary Moots to teach 
school No. 2 as shown her case, the board employed Anna 
Collins to teach school No. 1. When the new board decided 
"that Mary Moots was not legally hired and she should be 
notified to that effect," it transferred Anne Collins to
«school No, 2 and employed Signy K. Stoner to teach school 
No. 1 in place of Anne Collins. Contracts were signed for
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the term of nine months each, beginning September 8, 1930, 
with agreed compensations, the teachers immediately took 
charge of the schools, have been teaching there ever since 
with the full consent and acquiescence of the school board 
and under its direction, and there is no question raised as 
to their competency.
The plaintiffs brought this action to enjoin the 
school board from paying out any money to Anne Collins or to 
Signy K, Stoner, from interfering with Mary Mootz as teacher 
in school No, 2, and to compel them to observe the contract 
set forth by Mary Mootz in her case against the school 
board.
RULE; Taxpayers held not entitled to enjoin school 
board from preventing teacher alleged to have been validly 
employed from carrying out contract by employing another 
teacher; taxpayers held not entitled to enjoin school board 
from paying teacher employed by board because of previous 
employment by board’s predecessors of another teacher re­
placed by second teacher.
DECISION : Affirmed for defendants.
( g) Simmons v. Board of Educat1 on of 
Crosby. (193D 237 N. W. 700 ( 6l N. D. 212)
FACTS : This action was brought by the plaintiff, a
theater operator, suing as an elector and a taxpayer in the 
defendant school district to prevent school from renting the
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high school auditorium for theatrical entertainments. The 
District Court held that the provisions "shall apply only to 
professional entertainers and shall not be considered as 
restraining anyone connected with the defendant school or 
its classes, chautauquas, local entertainments, athletic 
contests, or those who are not professional entertainers." 
The District Court rendered judgment on these points for the 
plaintiff ; defendants appealed.
RULE ; Theater operator suing as taxpayer he Id not 
entitled to enjoin school district’s officers from renting 
out high school auditorium for theatrical entertainments 
where there was no showing of injury to taxpayers.
DECISION : Judgment reversed in favor of defendants.
(h) Jones v. Br i qhtwood Independent Schoo1
Dist. No. 2*
For brief, see ante Key 22, Case (d).
Rule applies to this Key.
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CHAPTER VIII
CLAIMS AGAINST DISTRICTS, AND ACTIONS
Key 112. Presentation and allowance of claims.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 113- Actions by or against the district.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 11̂ .. Capacity to sue or be sued.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 115. Rights of action and defenses.
(a) Farmers * and Merchants * Nat. Bank of
Val ley City v. School Dist. No. 53. N. W. 76?
(6 Dak. 255)
For brief, see ante Key 95 (1), Case (a).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
A school district, in an action against it on its 
warrants, will be permitted to defend on the ground that the 
warrants were issued in excess of its powers.
( b) Ogren v. Crvsta1 Springs School Dist.
No. 29. Kidder County. ( 1925) 203 N. W. 321+ (52
N. D. 455)
FACTS : This action may be and was considered as an
action for money had and received. In his complaint the 
plaintiff, generally setting out his version of the facts.
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alleges that he advanced the defendant the sum of $$,0 3 0; 
that he received therefor a warrant for that amount ; that 
the same was not paid for want of funds and was duly regis­
tered; that the defendant received the money thus paid by 
the plaintiff and used the same in the building of its 
schoolhouses; that payment has been demanded but refused.
RULE: Action for money had and received may not be
maintained against a school district, to recover money un­
lawfully borrowed by the treasurer of such district to re­
place defalcations of the district’s funds, although money 
was kept in Bank of North Dakota as required by Laws 1919, 
c. li|.7.
DECISION : Verdict for plaintiff affirmed...plaintiff
should recover amount district actually received from him.
Key 116. Time to sue and limitations.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 117. Use of name of district or of officers.
No cases in North Dakota,
Key 118. Parties.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 119. Process and appearance.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 120. Pleading.
#No cases in North Dakota.
Key 121. Evidence.
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No cases in North Dakota.
Key 122. Trial.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 1 23. Judgment.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 124. Execution and Judgment.
(a) Auran v. Mentor SchooI District No. _1
of Divide County. ( 1929) 228 N. W. 4 3$ (58 N. D.
934)
FACTS I In this action the plaintiff, having a judg­
ment against the defendant. Mentor School District No. 1 and 
the members of the board of education of the school dis­
trict, caused an execution to be issued on the Judgment and 
commenced a garnishment proceeding against Divide County, 
the county auditor, and the county treasurer. The garnish­
ees appeared by the state’s attorney and objected to the 
Jurisdiction of the court on the ground that the funds held 
by the garnishees were held as a trust fund, and not subject 
to execution, attachment, or garnishment.
RULE; (1) Public funds belonging to a school dis­
trict are not subject to execution, attachment, or garnish­
ment .
(2) Judgment against a school district can be col­
lected only under statute providing for levying taxes to pay 
Judgment (Comp. Laws 1913, sections 1223^ 1227)*
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Key 125. Appeal and error.
No cases In North Dakota.
Key 126. Costs.
No cases in North Dakota.
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CHAPTER IX 
TEACHERS
Key 127. Eligibility in general.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 128. Teachers* institutes.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 129. Certificate or license.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 130. In general.
(a) McDonald v. Nielsen. (1919) 175
N. W. 361 (I4.3 N. D. 3ij.6)
FACTS : The plaintiff, who was then incumbent, and 
the defendant were opposing candidates for the office of 
superintendent of public instruction with the result that 
the defendant won. The plaintiff, however, refused to sur­
render the office, contending that the defendant was not the 
"holder of a teacher * s certificate of the highest grade 
issued in the state," and hence was not eligible to the 
office.
The defendant contended that she is "the holder of 
such a certificate within the meaning of section 110^, Comp. 
Laws 1 913. It appears from the record In this case that the 
defendant on November 27» 1900, received from the then 
superintendent of public instruction a normal certificate
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under the provisions of section 7 3 8, Rev. Codes 1899. The 
result of the examination taken by her is indorsed on the 
certificate. The record also disclosed that on November 8, 
1902, the then superintendent of public instruction issued 
a professional certificate to the defendant.
RULE; Manifestly, the changes made in the former law 
as disclosed by section 1105» Comp. Laws 1913* do not indi­
cate any intention on the part of the legislature to dis­
qualify those then holding a teacher * s certificate of the 
highest grade issued in this state from holding the office 
of superintendent of public instruction.
A professional certificate issued under the provi­
sions of Rev. Codes 1899» section 737» is a "teacher’s cer­
tificate of the highest grade" issued in the state within 
the purview of Comp. Laws 1913» section 1105.
DECISION : Judgment affirmed for defendant.
( b) Wendt v. Wal1er.
For brief, see Key if8 (2), Case (a). Same rule
applies.
Key 131. Requisites to appointment or employment.
( a) Goose River Bank v . Wi 1low Lake School.
For brief, see ante Key 95 (2), Case (b). Same rule
applies.
#(b) Hosmer v. SheIdon Schoo1 Dis trict No.
2 ojT Ransom County. ( 1894) 59 N, W. 1035 ( 4 N. D.
197)
.
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FACTS; In this action judgnent was originally made 
In favor of the plaintiff, and the defendant school district 
appealed. It appears from the complaint that on August 7, 
1891* when the written contract between the plaintiff and 
the defendant was entered into, the plaintiff held a first 
grade certificate issued by the superintendent of Barnes 
County. This certificate would be valid in Hanscan County 
when indorsed by the superintendent of schools of Ransom 
County. Such indorsement was not made until September I4., 
189 1. The allegation is that it was made August 29, 1891, 
and the formal entry September ij.. But it was the formal 
entry that constituted the indorsement, and what preceded 
that was but a promise to indorse. Hence, neither at the 
time of entering into the contract, nor at the time of com­
mencing to teach, did the plaintiff hold a certificate in 
Ransom County. For that reason the defendant contends that 
the contract of employment, dated August 7> 1891, was void 
under section 122, c. 62, Laws 1890, as amended by section 
2lj., c. 56, Laws I8 9 1.
RULE: (1) A contract duly executed between the
proper officers of a school district and another person, by 
the terms of which said person is employed as a teacher in 
a public school in the district, is void where such person, 
at the time of making the contract, holds no certificate of 
authority to teach in the county vrtiere the district is
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
129
located.
(2) The subsequent procurement of such certificate 
will not enable such person to recover against the district 
damages for the breach of such contract.
DECISION : Judgment reversed in favor of defendant.
(c) Schafer v. Johns ( 1912) 137 N. W. 14.81
(2 3  N. D. 593)
FACTS: From a verdict in favor of the defendant the
plaintiff appealed. At the time the plaintiff entered upon 
a contract with the school board to teach in the school dis­
trict he did not possess a certificate of qualification. 
However, he was duly elected by the school board and signed 
a contract ; later the school board declared the contract 
void because he had not received a qualifying certificate at 
the time of the signing of the contract. Again, as In the 
preceding case, the plaintiff did receive a qualifying cer­
tificate to teach,
RULE : (We note In this case that there Is a revision
In law which holds differently than In the case preceding,) 
Under the school law, as revised and re-enacted by 
Laws 1911, c. 266, a contract between a school board and a 
teacher Is not void or voidable merely because at its date
the teacher did not hold a certificate or permit qualifying
*him to teach,
DECISION : Judgment reversed In favor of plaintiff.
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Key 132. Revocation.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 133. Selection, appointment, and term of employ­
ment in general.
Rules of board of education, see ante Key 55.
(a) Mootg V. BeIvea.
For brief, see ante Key 111 (f).
(b) Beckman v. BeIvea.
For brief, see ante Key 111, Case (c).
Further ruling in case, pertinent to this Key sec­
tion, as follows:
School board’s formal approval of previous informal 
employment of teacher constitutes ratification of employ­
ment .
( c) Seher v. Wpodlawn School Dist. No, 26, 
Kidder County. ( 1953) 59 N. W. 2d 805
FACTS : Inasmuch as this case received broad publici­
ty in North Dakota, and because it provides for broad appli­
cation, it shall be discussed at length with rulings appli­
cable here and in sections following.
This is a teacher's action for breach of teaching 
contract consisting of his dismissal prior to expiration of 
contractual term wherein defendant contended that dismissal 
had been for cause. The district court entered Judgment for 
the plaintiff, and defendant appealed. The Supreme Court
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held that the evidence sustained the determination of the 
trial Judge that plaintiff had not been guilty of plain 
violation of contract, gross immorality, or flagrant neglect 
of duty.
RULE; A school teacher, including a superintendent, 
employed by school district is not an "officer" of the dis­
trict, but is a mere "employee," and relationship between 
district and teacher is purely contractual.
Key 1314.. Contracts of employment.
No cases in North DeiKota.
Key 135- Making, requisites, and validity.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 135 (1). Authority to contract in general.
(a) Auran v. Mentor School Di strict No. 2.»
Divide County.
For brief, see ante Key 121*., Case (a). Same rule 
applies.
Key 135 Authority to bind successors.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 135 (3 ). Requisites and validity in general.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 135 (I4.). Formal requisites.
(a) Michae1sohn v. Norway Schoo1 Distrlet
No. 12 of McHenry County. ( 1933) 2i|.9 N. W. 776
(6 3 N. D. 683)
«
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FACTS ; This is an action to recover damages for the 
refusal of the defendant school corporation to execute a 
teacher’s contract with the plaintiff. The contract was 
oral, and the defendant declined to execute a contract in 
writing, and later would not allow the plaintiff to enter 
upon the performance of his oral contract.
RULE ; Statutory requirement that contracts for em­
ployment of teachers be in writing held mandatory barring 
teacher’s action for damages against school district based 
on oral contract of employment. Until a contract for the 
employment of the teacher has been entered in the manner re­
quired by the statute, no binding contract is formed which 
can be used as the basis of an action for damages against 
the district. (Comp. Laws 1913, section 1178)
DECISION : Affirmed for defendant.
Key 135 (5). Ratification and estoppel.
No cases for North Dakota.
Key 136. Construction and operation.
(a) Auran v. Mentor School Distri ct No.
Divi de County.
For brief, see ante Key 12i|., Case (a).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
Teacher cannot employ, nor require school board to 
accept, substitute In performance of services she contracted
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to perform.
( b) Seher v. Woodlawn School Dist. No. 26 
of Kidder County.
For brief, see ante Key 133» Case (c).
Ruling pertinent to this Key section follows:
The laws in existence when contract is entered into 
become a part of the contract, as though written therein, 
and, therefore, statutory provision that school board could 
dismiss teacher at any time for certain causes became part 
of teacher *s contract. (NDRC 19l*.3» 15-2508)
Key 137* Performance or breach.
(a) Auran v. Mentor School District No. _1. 
For brief, see Key 111, Case Ce).
Key 138. Remedies for enforcement.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 139. Resignation and abandonment.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 1^0. Suspension, removal, and reassignment.
No cases listed for North Dakota.
Key II4.I. In general.
Key 11+.1 (2). Authority to remove or discharge in 
genera 1.
No cases for North Dakota.
Key 141 (3 ). Contracts reserving right.
No cases in North Dakota.
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Kcv 114,1 ( I4.). Grounds for removal or suspension.
(a) Clark v. Wi Id Rose Sped a 1 School 
District No. 20* 182 N. W. 307 ikl N. D. 297)
FACTS ; On April 22, 1919, at a special meeting of 
the school board, the board discussed the advisability of 
dismissing the plaintiff for voluntary neglect of work by 
not reporting for duty on the preceding day, which was Mon­
day. The clerk was authorised to deliver a communique to 
her, and with it a warrant for her salary to date. On the 
following day, no resignation having been received, the 
board held another special meeting, at which it was resolved 
that the plaintiff be dismissed from her position for the 
good of the district. A communication to this effect was 
authorized, in which it was stated that the dismissal should 
take effect immediately, and that the notice was given by 
virtue of plaintiff *s refusal to hand in her resignation as 
requested.
On the above facts the district court was called upon 
to determine whether or not the plaintiff had been legally 
dismissed and removed under subdivision 8 of section 1251» 
Comp. Laws 1913.
RULE; Where a board of education of a special school 
district undertakes to dismiss and remove a school teacher 
under subdivision 8 of section 1251» Compiled Laws of 1913» 
which provides for removal "for cause," It is prerequisite
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to a valid removal that the teacher be informed of the 
charges and be given reasonable opportunity for a hearing 
thereon,
DECISION ; Judgment for plaintiff,
C b) Seher v. Woodlawn Schoo1 Distrlet No.
26.
For brief, see ante Key 133» Case (c).
Ruling pertinent to this Key section, as follows:
(1) A school board's dismissal of a teacher is an 
exercise of executive function, but whether dismissal con­
stituted a breach of teacher's contract is for Judicial de­
termination, and, therefore, decision of school board, which 
had dismissed teacher prior to termination of contractual 
term, that there was cause for dismissal was not final or 
controlling upon court in teacher's action for breach of 
teaching contract. (NDRC 1943# 12-500)
(2) Public school education is a governmental, 
rather than a proprietary, function and legislature may de­
clare that question of facts as to whether there is cause 
for dismissing a teacher shall be administrative rather than 
a judicial question. (NDRC 1943, 12-506)
Key 141 (5)« Proceedings and review,
(a) McWi thy v. Heart River School Di strict 
No. 22. 32 N. W. 2d 686 (75 N. D. 744) R. C. 1943,
15-2 508, 15-2509, 15-3615-16.
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FACTS: The plaintiff brought this action for a bal­
ance she claims due under a contract with the defendant 
school district. The contract is admitted. It provided 
that plaintiff should teach the school for eight months.
She was paid her salary from September 11, 191*4, until 
December 1, 1944. During those three months eight children 
were in attendance, only seven of whom were of compulsory 
school age. They belonged to two families and were all the 
children of school age in the district. One of these fami­
lies was that of the president of the school board. The 
evidence shows that the plaintiff had some difficulties with 
discipline in her school. In early November she got into a 
dispute with the son of the president of the school board 
over a matter of history in which she was clearly right.
The son defied her. The father took the son * s part. About 
the 11th of November he took his three children out of 
school and sent them to another school. He also visited the 
father of the other family attending school, and told him to 
keep his children out "for ten days— enough days so the con­
tract of the teacher would be void." Then on November 29 
the school board met and passed a resolution closing the 
school on the grounds that the attendance was less than six 
for ten consecutive days. The evidence does not show that 
the plaintiff was notified thereof. Shortly after the ten 
days had expired the five children belonging to the other
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family returned to school. Plaintiff continued to teach 
them the rest of the term. In that she was not disturbed, 
although the president of the school board knew that she was 
teaching. She reported to the county superintendent. Her 
pupils took the required examinations and passed.
The evidence indicates clearly that the cause of the 
attempted closing of the school was the dissatisfaction of 
the president of the school board, with plaintiff * s conduct 
of the school and the progress of his children under plain­
tiff’s teaching.
RULE ; Proceeding to dismiss teacher for failure to 
perform her duty or to remove her for inccxnpetency must be 
brought under statutory provision for revocation of teach­
er’s certificate for incompetency or provision for dismissal 
of teacher for violation of contract or neglect of duty 
after hearing and notice to teacher in sufficient time to 
prepare defense, not under statute providing for discontinu­
ance of school when average attendance falls below six 
pupils for ten consecutive days. (R. C. 19i|-3» l$-2^08, 
15-2 5 0 9, 15-3615, 15-3616)
DECISION ; Case remanded with directions to district 
court to order judgment for the balance due on the contract.
(b) Clark V. W iId Rose SpeciaI School
eDi strict No. 9 0 .
For brief, see ante Key lij.1 (if). Case (a).
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Further ruling in case, pertinent to this Key section, 
as follows:
Where a board of education of a special school dis­
trict undertakes to dismiss and remove a school teacher 
under Comp. Laws 1913, section 1251* subdivision 8 , which 
provides for removal "for cause," it is prerequisite to a 
valid removal that the teacher be informed of the charges 
and be given a reasonable opportunity for a hearing thereon.
( c) Seher v. Vfoodlawn School District
No. 26.
For brief, see ante Key 133* Case (c).
Ruling pertinent to this Key section, as follows:
Statutes providing for review by superintendent of 
public instruction of decisions of county superintendent of 
schools was not intended to apply in case of dismissal of 
school teacher, and, therefore, appeal to superintendent of 
public instruction by teacher who was dismissed prior to 
termination of contractual period was not a condition pre­
cedent to commencement of action for breach of teacher*s 
contract. (NDRC 1914-3* 15-2107* 15-221?)
Key II4.I (6 ). Reinstatement.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key II42. Actions for damages.
(a) Seher v. Woodlawn Schoo1 Dis trict
No. 2 6 ,
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For brief, see ante 133, Case (c).
Further rulings in the case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
(1) See ruling for this case above. Key lî-l (5>),
Case (c),
(2) See ruling for this case above. Key II4.I (U-),
Case ( b)•
(3) Burden of proof is upon school district in 
action by school teacher for breach of contract based upon 
dismissal of teacher prior to expiration of contractual 
period to prove by fair preponderance of evidence that the 
school board had justifiable cause for such dismissal, and 
fact of dismissal is no evidence that it was justifiable.
Where teacher was dismissed without cause before ex­
piration of term of his employment, was paid to date of dis­
missal, and suit for breach of teacher * s contract resulting 
from dismissal was not tried until term of employment had 
expired, amount recoverable by teacher was the contract 
price, less what he earned, or by reasonable diligence could 
have earned, subsequent to his discharge. (NDRC 19̂ .3, 1^-
2 1 0 7, 15-2 2 1 7, 15-2 5 0 8)
Key II1.3 . Compensation.
No cases in North Dakota,
Key 1144. In general.
No cases in North Dakota.
«
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Key ll|î ( 1 ) . Right to compensation in general.
No cases in North Dakota,
Key lijii. (2), Effect of closing school because of 
contagious disease.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key lijĵ. (3)- Effect of removal, suspension, or 
abandonment of employment.
( a) McWithy v. Heart River School Di str i ct
No. 22.
For brief, see ante Key li|.l (5)» Case (a).
Further ruling pertinent to this Key section, as fol­
lows :
A teacher receiving no notice of district school 
board's resolution discontinuing school taught by her be­
cause of average attendance of less than six pupils for ten 
consecutive days, was justified in continuing to teach five 
children, returning after such time, with belief that clos­
ing of school was abandoned, and was entitled to her salary 
for whole school term under teaching contract.
Key II1J4. ( fj.) . Rate or amount of compensation.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key li+li- (5). Payment, and orders therefor.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key lî.5. Actions.
( a) MeWithy v. Heart River Schoo1 Di strict
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For brief, see ante Key H4.I (5), Case (a).
Further ruling pertinent to this Key section, as fol­
lows :
In action against school district for balance due 
teacher under contract for services rendered after passage 
of school board * s resolution closing school on ground of in­
sufficient attendance, district school board, attempting to 
show an affirmative defense that it acted under statute, had 
burden of showing by preponderance of evidence that proper 
and convenient school facilities for pupils were furnished 
in another school as required by statute. (R. C. 19li.3» 15-
2509.)
Key lif.6 . Pensions.
(a) State v. Hauqe. (1917) 1614. N. W. 289
(37 N. D. 583) L. R. A. 191ÔA, 522.
FACTS ; The purpose of this action is to test the 
validity of the so-called Teachers* insurance and Retirement 
Act. It is based on appeal from a Judgment directing and 
commanding the defendant, as county treasurer of Ransom 
County, to set aside from the county tuition fund a sum 
equal to ten cents for each child of school age and to 
transmit the same to the state treasurer, as required by 
section 1515 of the Compiled Laws of 1913, as amended by 
chapter II4.O of the Laws of 1915.
#
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The defendant and appellant contends that the act, 
though attempting to create a teachers* insurance and re­
tirement fund, does not provide for the levy of the tax 
directly, but attempts to reach into a fund created for 
another purpose to carry out its object. He submits that a 
person teaching in one part of the state is not giving his 
services to the support of schools in another part of the 
state, or in other words, funds raised by taxation for the 
support of schools in one county are used for past or pres­
ent services performed in another county, and this he claims 
cannot be done.
RULE; There being no constitutional requirement that 
taxes levied for general public purpose must be disbursed in 
taxing district, there can be no objection to Comp. Laws 
1913» section 1515* as amended by Laws 1915* c. 1^0, pro­
viding for a teachers' pension fund, as taxes are collected
throughout the state and pensions are not always paid to 
teachers residing in the taxing district,
DECISION ; Affirmed in favor of plaintiff. The es­
tablishment of state teachers' pension fund is a public pur­
pose and enterprise, within the power of the Legislature.
( b) Payne v . Board of Trustees of the 
Teachers' Insurance and Retirement Fund.
For brief, see ante Key 100, Case Ic).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
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section, as follows:
(1) Relation between teachers and state retirement 
fund is contractual in nature, and principles of law govern­
ing contracts apply as far as possible. (R. C. 19W  and 
1914.7 Supp., section 15-3901 et seq.)
(2) Teacher upon entering service of teaching ac­
cepts provisions of Teachers* Insurance and Retirement Act, 
and by continued teaching and payment of assessments for 25 
years performs obligations imposed thereby, relation thus 
arising being subject only to such limited modification pro­
vided for or inherent in laws to maintain the fund in such 
condition that intent of the statute to encourage persons to 
enter and remain in teaching profession may be obtained.
(See citation at end of preceding paragraph.)
(3) Where teacher completed service on May 31» 1914.7* 
at the age of 59 years after teaching required number of 
years in state public schools, teacher became eligible for 
annuity under the Teachers* Insurance and Retirement Act, 
the amount thereof to be measured by terms of the statute in 
effect on May 31» rather than under the statute which went 
into effect on July 1, 1914-7» notwithstanding teacher’s ap­
plication for annuity was not made until August I9I4.7 .
(R. C. I9I4.3 and 1914-7 Supp., sections 15-3901 et seq., 15- 
3928, 15-3930.)
(c) State ex re 1. Chamber lain v. Johnstone.
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et al., ( 1935) 262 w. w. 193 (65 N. D. 727)
FACTS : The relator is a school teacher who "after 
more than fifteen years of service as a teacher in the pub­
lic schools of this State had elapsed” was suffering from a 
permanent disability which she suffered on March 11, 1929, 
The permanent character of her disability was determined 
under the provisions of subdivision 2 of section I5l8, Comp. 
Laws, as amended by chapter 161, section 6, Sess. Laws of 
1919. She says that she is entitled to annuity payable from 
and after the date of her disability, rather than from and 
after the time when she completed payment on her assess­
ments.
RULE : Disabled teacher he id required to pay into
Teachers' Insurance and Retirement Fund full amount of all 
statutory assessments before being entitled to share in 
fund, and when, after disability is suffered, there is an 
amount due on such assessments, right to annuity does not 
accrue until deficiency in assessments is paid, and does not 
relate back to date of disability. (Comp, Laws 1913* sec­
tions 1504» 1522, and sections I5l8> subd. 2, 1521, as 
amended by Laws 1919, c . 161, sections 6, 6, and section 
1524* as amended by Laws 1919 * c. I6 I, section 10.)
( d) Barrett v . Board of Trustees of Teach­
ers* Insurance and Retirement Fund. (1952) 55 N, W.
576.
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FA.CTS î The plaint iff is more than 55 years of age 
and has been a teacher in the public schools of North Dakota, 
as the term teaching is defined in section 15-3901, NDRC 
191+3, since the year 1901. Several years prior to July 1, 
191+7, she had completed 25 years of teaching in the public 
schools of this state and had paid into the Teachers* Insur­
ance and Retirement Fund the assessments necessary to make 
her eligible for retirement under the provisions of the act 
which is now Chapter 15-39, NDRC 191+3 and supplement there­
to, but she continued to teach.
For more than five years next preceding August 15, 
I9I+7 , she was employed as Deputy County Superintendent of 
Schools in and for Stutsman County, during which time she 
paid an assessment into Fund from her salary. On August 15, 
191+7 , she retired from that office and applied for retire­
ment under the provisions of the Act.
The defendants refused to grant the petition of the
plaintiff for pension or annuity under Chapter 165, SLND
I9I+7 , for the reason that she had not been employed as a
teacher for a term comprising a school year subsequent to
July 1, 191+7 , the effective date of Chapter 165. The period
of her teaching service after the effective date of the new
statute was from July 1 to August 15, 191+7, or approximately
*six weeks.
RULE ; Where teacher had been employed as public
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school teacher, or equivalent thereof, from 1901 to August 
15» 1914.7 » and, prior to July 1, 19k7, had qualified for re­
tirement benefits under the 1914-3 act, but had spent last 
five years as acting county superintendent of schools, 
teacher had continued to teach within the meaning of the 
1949 retirement act and, upon payment of additional assess­
ments from her wages, was entitled to qualify under the new 
retirement act which became effective after July 1, 191+7. 
(NDRC I9I4.3 , 15-3901 et seq., 15-3927, 15-3928, as amended by 
Laws 191+7 , c. 165; NDRC 191+9 Supp. 15-3928.)
Key 11+7. Duties and liabilities.
No cases in North Dakota.
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CHAPTER X
PUPILS AND CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE OF SCHOOLS
Key II4.8 . Nature of right to instruction in general.
No cases for North Dakota.
Key 149. Eligibility.
Key 153* Residence.
(a) Gardner v. Board of Education of City 
of Fargo. (I8 88) 38 N. W. k33 (5 Dak. 259)
FACTS; This is an action in which the plaintiff 
claimed for his children the school privileges due a resi­
dent of a certain city. He owns a farm which has been his 
domicile, takes his family and part of his furniture to the 
city during the winter, for the purpose of giving his family 
the social and school advantages, and lives there in a 
rented house, employing a hired man to take care of his farm 
while the family is absent. He returns with his family and 
furniture each spring to carry on the farm. He has voted 
unchallenged at an election in the city; he has also been a 
town officer where the farm is situated.
RULE ; In determining the true residence, choice is
an element to be considered, but it is inferior in weight to
tangible acts indicating residence.
#DECISION : Judgment affirmed for the defendants. 
Farmer’s legal residence continues to be at the farm.
#
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(b) Todd V. Board of Education of City of
Wi 111ston.
For brief, see ante Key 20, Case (a).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows:
Governing board of receiving district, to whose high 
school nonresident pupils apply for admission, has discre­
tion to determine iidiether facilities warrant their admission, 
and such determination will not be disturbed by courts, ex­
cept by manifest abuse. (Laws 1921, c, 107î Laws 1925» c. 
189; Comp. Laws 1913, sections 1179, 1251 » subsec, II4., 1300.)
Key 154' Assignment or admission to particular 
schools•
(a) Todd V, Board of Education of Clty of
Vfi 1 li ston.
For brief, see ante Key 20, Case (a).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key
section, as follows :
Where high school district already had so many non­
resident pupils that buildings were overcrowded and teachers 
overloaded, excluding further pupils from high school by 
school board was not discriminating. (Ccanp, Laws 1913» sec. 
1251» subsec. 11.)
( b) State V. Aigulst. ( 1930) 231 N. W.
952 (59 N. D. 762) A. L, R. 4 9 4 .
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FACTSî The defendants are residents of West Fargo 
school district, a common school district which contains no 
high school. Children of the defendants have finished the 
eighth grade in their district and attend the high schools 
of Fargo, an independent school district organized under a 
special statute of the territorial Legislature of 188$ and 
governed by the board of education of the city of Fargo.
This board of education by appropriate resolution had de­
clared that all nonresident pupils may not attend its school 
without paying $100 per year for tuition, and charged the 
children of the defendants this sum. The defendants, as the 
board of directors of West Fargo school district, offer to 
pay the sum of $1.50 per week for tuition and no more. The 
schools of the city of Fargo do not receive any aid from the 
state of North Dakota under the provisions of sections llj.30- 
114.3 8, Compiled Laws of 1915 (section ll|.33 of Supp. 1925) and 
"are not in fact supervised, governed and inspected by the 
officials and departments of the State of North Dakota men­
tioned, in the said acts of its legislature."
RULE ; High school in special district, not super­
vised by state department of public instruction nor receiv­
ing state aid, he Id not "standardized high school" within 
statute relating to admission of nonresident pupils. (Comp. 
Laws 1925# sections 114.38a 1-114.38a3 . )
DECISI ON : Affirmed for plaintiffs.
*
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Key 155. Proceedings to compel admission.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 156-157- Health regulations in general.
(a) Martin v. Craig. (1919) 173 N. W.
787 (4 2 N. D. 2 1 3)
FACTS ! The plaintiff and appellant is the legal cus­
todian of two children of school age, and he petitioned to 
compel the defendants to admit them to school. The defend­
ants Justify the refusal on the ground that one of the chil­
dren had been found by a reputable physician and by a quali­
fied representative of the Federal health service to be 
afflicted with trachoma, a disease of the eyes which is com­
municable and of a very serious nature, frequently resulting 
in blindness.
RULE: An order by a county board of health, requir­
ing school officers to exclude from the schools children 
affected or suspected of being affected with trachoma, he Id 
reasonable.
DECISION : Affirmed for defendants.
Key 158 (1). Vaccination in general.
( a) Rhea v. Board of Educat ion of Devi Is
Lake Specia1 School Distrlet.
For brief, see ante Key 55» Case (b).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
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Comp. Laws 1913, section 1̂ 25* providing for vaccina­
tion of minors, and section 1̂ 26, entamcrating causes for 
which children may be excluded from schools, but not ex­
press ly Including nonvaccination, construed together, do not 
permit exclusion on sole ground of nonvaccination.
Key 159. Payment of tuition.
(a) State v. Va 1ley City Special School
District.
For brief, see ante Key 11, Case (a).
Further ruling in the case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
Laws 1915, c. ÎI42, relating to payment of tuition by 
school districts for students or pupils attending any school 
connected with the State University, or other higher insti­
tution of learning, wherein students or members of the 
faculty of such University or other institution teach, he Id 
not unconstitutional as violating Const, sections 152 and
I5il-.
( b ) Todd V. Boar d of Educ at i on of Ci ty of
Wi 1li ston.
For brief, see ante Key 2 0, Case (a).
Further ruling in this case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
Tuition charge imposed upon nonresident pupils ad­
mitted to high school must be alike to all (Laws 1921,
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c. 107j Laws 192$, c. 189; Comp. Laws 1913, sections 1179, 
1251 j subscc. lif., 1300).
(c) State V, Alqttist.
For brief, see ante Key l$l4-. Case (b).
Further ruling in this case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows:
School district not having required high school 
course held not obligated to pay tuition of its pupils 
attending high school other than "standardised high school” 
(Comp. Laws Supp. 1925» sec. Ii*.38a2).
( d) Anderson v . Breithbarth. ( 1933) 2i*.5
N. W. I4.63 (62 N. D. 7 0 9)
FACTS : For our purposes, it need only be stated that
this case requires a definition of the phrase "residing in 
the district," as used in section 1343 of the Supplement, 
which says: "The public schools provided for in this chap­
ter (sections 1105-1422 of the Compiled Laws of 1913) shall 
be at all times equally free, open and accessible to all 
children over six and under twenty-one years of age residing 
in the district."
Because plaintiff*s parents arc separated, she has by 
her wishes, and with the consent of her mother, come to the 
school district to live with her aunt and uncle, and has 
been a member of their family ever since, and has been 
treated as such.
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RULE ; Phrase "residing in district," within statute 
declaring schools free, is not restricted to parents' domi­
cile, but means actual residence of child. Child of non­
resident parents, living as member of aunt's family In local 
school district, held "residing in district" within statute 
declaring schools free. (Comp. Lavrs Supp. 1925, section 
1314.3.)
(e) Batty v. Board of Education of City of
Wi 1 liston.
For brief, see ante Key 11, Case (b). Same rule 
applies.
Under statute, school board held without power to im­
pose tuition charge on resident pupil of school age vAio has 
failed to complete high school course within prescribed time 
on account of indifference and indolence, notwithstanding 
that school board has wide discretion in management of 
schools. (Comp. Laws 1913, sections 1229-1285, 1251, sub­
sec. 11, 1343; Laws 1935, c. 260; Const, section 147 et seq.)
Key 159^. Transportation of pupils to and from 
schools or provisions in lieu of.
(a) State v. Mostad. ( 1914) 148 N. W.
831 (28 N. D. 244)
FACTS: This is an action to compel the school board
#
to furnish transportation for the children of the petitioner 
to and from a certain school located in school district
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No, 10, Ward County. The petitioner’s children were boys 
from 10 to 19 years of age who had to cross a frozen river 
and walk a distance of from one-fourth to one-third of a 
mile to meet a team which had been sent for the children of 
two other families who lived about a mile further on. The 
river was reasonably passable for pedestrians, and all three 
families lived beyond the two-and-a-half-mile limit and 
needed to be accommodated. For the team to have picked up 
the petitioner's children would have required it to go two 
miles out of its way to a bridge; also extra expense would 
have been involved,
RULE ; Under Laws 1911# c. 266, section 232, trans­
portation must be furnished to children living more than two 
and a half miles from the district school, regardless of 
whether or not the district is consolidated.
DECISION ; In a reversal of the trial court judgment 
for plaintiff, the Supreme Court judgment he Id that it is 
not "an unjust or illegal discrimination," nor "a denial of 
transportation," to require the children of the petitioner 
to walk the short distance across the river to meet the 
team. Judgment for the defendants.
( b) Eastgate v. Osago Schoo1 District of 
Ne Ison County. ( 19 19 ) 171 N . W, 96 ( i+l N. D. 5l8)
FACTS; This is an action by the plaintiff to recover 
the sum of for conveying his children from his home to
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one of the schools of the district located at the village of 
Pekin, in said district, during the school years of 191 2,
1913, 191i|-, and 1915. The school is alleged to be a dis­
tance of five miles by the nearest route from the residence 
of the plaintiff. The plaintiff testifies there was a 
school two miles south of them, which was three and a fourth 
miles by the nearest travelled route.
. RULE; (1) Under Laws 1911» c. 266, section 232, 
subd. I4., as amended by Laws 1913» c. 26?, and Laws 1915» 
c. lU-l, imposing duty upon school boards to require children 
between the ages of six and 15 to attend public schools, and 
to provide transportation for such children who reside be­
yond district prescribed by law, it is the duty of the 
school board to ascertain what children within district re­
side beyond such distance from the school and convey them to 
schoo 1 .
(2) Where the school board neglects or fails to fur­
nish transportation to children between the ages of six and 
15 years, in disregard of law, and the parent or guardian 
of any such children convejs them to the nearest public 
school in the district by the nearest way, and such service 
is accepted by the school district, it Is under implied con­
tract to compensate him therefor.
(3) The words "nearest route," as used in Laws 1911, 
c. 266, section 232, subd. I4., as amended by Laws 1913,
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Cm 2 6 7, and Comp. Laws 1913, section 131*2, as amended and 
re-enacted by Laws 1915» c. II4.I, relating to transportation 
of pupils living a certain distance from schools by the 
nearest route, mean the nearest public route or one which 
has been duly authorized or exists by law.
(c) Sandrv v, Brooklyn School Pist. No. 78 
of WI lliams County. ( 1921) 182 N. W. 689 ( l*-7 N. D.
kkk) 15 A. L. R. 719
FACTS : In an action brought by a driver to recover
the compensation stipulated in a driver * s contract with a 
school district for the transportation of teachers and 
pupils to and from a consolidated school, \diere plaintiff 
seeks to recover upon his own contract and upon claims aris­
ing under three similar contracts of which he is assignee, 
for a period of 13 weeks, during which the school was closed 
on account of an epidemic of influenza, it is held:
RULE: The driver's contract is not so far analogous
to a teacher's contract that the driver, upon showing readi­
ness to perform during a period when the school Is closed on 
account of an epidemic, may recover the agreed compensation 
as upon full service performed.
(d) Seller v. Gelhar. (1926) 209 N. W.
376 (54 N. D. 245)
FACTS : This action relates to the transportation of
pupils to and from a consolidated school. The plaintiff is
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the father of a girl under 11 years of age. Prior to con­
solidation there was a school within three-fourths of a mile 
from his home. During the first two years after the girl 
became of school age, the district provided vehicular trans­
portation for her to and frcm the consolidated school, but 
in 1923 the practice was discontinued. The reason assigned 
for ceasing to operate the bus was that the plaintiff’s 
child was the only person of school age in that part of the 
district and that, consequently, the cost of furnishing ac­
tual transportation was greater than the district board felt 
it could justifiably incur. The plaintiff is 71 years old. 
He testifies that it is impossible for him to transport his 
daughter to school; that, as a result, his child is being 
deprived of the educational advantages to which she is en­
titled under the Constitution and the laws of this state.
RULE: Statute providing for transportation of pupils
of consolidated schools, does not deprive children or guard­
ians of any constitutional rights merely because option as 
to furnishing transportation or paying compensation therefor 
lies within discretion of school board or in judgment of 
people through election (Comp. Laws 1913, section 13U.3, and 
section 1190, as amended by Laws 1921, c. 113; Laws 1919 
(Sp. Sess.), c. 53, amending Laws 1919, c. 199, and Laws . 
1915, c. 127; Const, sections II4.7-lij-9 ).
DECISION : Judgment affirmed for defendants.
.#
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(e) Monke v. Iowa School District No. ^ of 
Hettinger County. ( 1927) 215 N. W. 2Bk ( 55 N. D. 
809)
FACTS ; This action is brought by the parent of a 
school child to recover transportation under the compulsory 
attendance statute as it was amended in 1917» Session Laws 
1917» c, 2 0 6. In the trial court the plaintiff had Judgment 
for an amount calculated upon the basis of the number of 
days the child was actually transported by the parent in 
three years at the rate of 35 cents per day, as fixed by the 
school board. From this Judgment the plaintiff has appealed, 
and assigns as error the refusal of the trial court to enter 
Judgment based upon the number of days the child attended 
school rather than the number of days the plaintiff fur­
nished transportation.
RULE; Parent, entitled to compensation for trans­
porting pupil to school, cannot recover for days child at­
tended school when not transported (Comp. Laws 1913, section 
13i+2, as amended by Laws 1917, c. 206).
DECISION : Affirmed for defendant.
(f) Parrish v, Menz School District No.
Sioux County. (1929) 223 N. W. 2Qk (57 N. D. 6 I6 )
FACTS : This is an appeal from a Judgment in favor of
the plaintiff in an action to recover for transportation 
furnished a pupil attending school. The child of the
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plaintiff was of compulsory school age, and the plaintiff 
was responsible for her attendance at school. They lived on 
a farm in the defendant school district. The plaintiff had 
transported the child to and from school for 169 days, such 
school being maintained in a common school district adjacent 
to the defendant school district and being more than two 
miles and a quarter distant from the plaintiff’s dwelling 
house. The officers of the defendant school district ar­
ranged for such attendance and paid tuition in the adjoining 
district for the plaintiff’s child but refused to provide 
for transportation or to compensate the plaintiff therefor. 
The nearest school in the defendant school district was ap­
proximately five miles from the plaintiff’s home. The trial 
court found the reasonable value of the transportation to be 
25 cents a day, the minimum fixed by statute, and judgment 
was entered accordingly,
RULE : ( 1) Officers of common school district may
arrange for paying transportation of pupils to attend school 
in another district (Comp. Laws 1913, section 1179).
(2) Obligation of common school district to furnish 
transportation is not limited to pupils attending school 
within district (Comp. Laws Supp, 1925, section 131̂ 2).
DECISION ; Judgment affirmed for plaintiff. •
( g) McWithy v. Heart River School Dist.
No. 22.
«
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For brief, see ante Key 11̂.1 (5), Case (a).
Further ruling in this case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows;
A district school board must furnish adequate, con­
venient, and proper facilities for every child of school age 
in district, though it closes school district, as authorized 
by statute, because of average attendance of less than six 
pupils for 10 consecutive days, in view of provision in such 
statute that school can be closed only if proper and conven­
ient school facilities for pupils can be provided in another 
school in same territory until closed school may be reopened 
by board. (R. C. 1914-3, 15-2509)
(h) Reich V, Dietz School District No. 16.
Grant County. ( 1952) 55 N. W. 2d 638
FACTS : This is an action in which a parent voluntar­
ily transported his own children to school after refusing 
several offers by the school district to furnish vehicular 
transportation or its equivalent. For such transportation 
the plaintiff parent sought more compensation than that 
fixed by statute to pay transportation charges.
RULE: As used in statute authorizing school district
to furnish vehicular transportation for pupils and in stat­
ute authorizing school district to pay transportation allow­
ance to each family living more than two miles from school 
district, the words "to each family" are not to be construed
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as meaning ”to every family," but, on contrary, statutes, 
when construed together, authorize school board in its dis­
cretion to pay some patrons according to number of miles 
travelled and to furnish other patrons vehicular transporta­
tion or its equivalent.
Parent voluntarily transporting his own children to 
school after refusing several offers by school district to 
furnish vehicular transportation or its equivalent could 
recover only compensation fixed by statute authorizing 
school district to pay transportation charges, there being 
no implied contract with school district for reasonable 
value of parent's services. (NDRC 191̂.9 Supp. lS-3k-0k.; NDRC 
1943* 15-3̂ 1-05 - ) (Citation also applies to preceding para­
graph, )
Key 160. Compulsory attendance.
(a) State ex re1. Fried v. MeDona Id.
( 1926) 208 N. W. 99 (53 N. D. 7 2 3)
FACTS : In this action the relator, Jacob Fried,
seeks relief from a Judgment of the district court of Morton 
County, He was prosecuted on the charge of having violated 
the Compulsory School Attendance Law, section 13^2, C. L.
1913, as amended by chapter 206, S. L. 1917. A fine was 
imposed. Defendant is the sheriff of Morton County. •
Relator, Fried, is the parent of four children of 
school age residing within Crown Butte school district No.
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15. It is not disputed that the relator lives more than two 
and one-fourth miles from the nearest school, and that the 
school board offered to pay the defendant 50 cents a day for 
transporting his children to school.
It is the contention of the state that the tender of 
compensation is the equivalent of offering transportation, 
within subdivision 5 of section 131 2̂ , and that, the parent 
having failed to require his children to attend school after 
such tender by the board, he violated the provisions of the 
Compulsory School Attendance Law.
RULE ; Where board of common school district offers 
to pay 50 cents per day per family for transporting pupils 
living more than two and one-quarter miles from school, but 
does not offer actual carriage of children, their parent and 
guardian is not subject to the penalties of Compulsory 
School Attendance Law. (Laws 1911» c. 266, section 232, 
subd. i4-, amended by Laws 1913» c. 267--Comp. Laws 1913, 
section 131̂ .2— , amended by Laws 1915, c. lij-l, and Laws 1917» 
c. 206.)
DECISION : Relator, Fried, to be released. Fine re­
mitted. Not guilty.
(b) State V. Kesse1. ( 1926) 208 N, W.
814.5 ( 53 N. D. 723)
FACTS ; Evidence in this action was held sufficient 
to establish that the residence of the defendant was within
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two and one-fourth miles of the school by the nearest route, 
yet he failed to send his children of school age to school.
RULE; (1) Complaint charging failure to send chil­
dren to school, as required by statute, and alleging facts 
constituting offense charging it to be contrary to form of 
statute and against peace and dignity of state, was suffi­
cient, even though specific statute had been amended (Comp. 
Laws 1913, sections 1314-2 , 10685* 10693* Laws 1915* c . II4.I ; 
Laws 1917* c, 2 0 6).
(2) Evidence he Id sufficient to establish residence 
of person accused of violation of Compulsory School Attend­
ance Law was within two and one-fourth miles from school by 
nearest route (Comp. Laws 1913* section 1314-2 , as amended by 
Laws 1917* c. 2 0 6).
DECISION ; Judgment against defendant affirmed.
Key 161. Truants and truant officers and schools.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 162. School terms, vacations, and holidays.
(a) State ex re1 Beierle v. Sei be 1 «
( 1930) 230 N. W. 73I4.
FACTS : This is an action in which the plaintiffs
attempted to compel the officers of a common school district 
to open and conduct a school within the district. The 
school district within which the petitioners reside had at 
one time organized schools which were conducted in four
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school buildings within the district. On or about March 8, 
1928, the school conducted in building No, I4. was discontin­
ued owing to lack of attendance. During the following 
school year additional children of school age moved into 
that portion of the district previously accommodated by the 
school that was closed, the total number not being suffi­
cient to invoke the mandatory duty of the school board to
organize a separate section.
RULE ; Board could not be compelled to reopen one of 
district schools, though new children moved into territory 
previously accommodated by closed school (Comp. Laws 1913, 
section 1 1 8 9, and section II8 8 , as amended by Laws 1923,
c. 2 8 3 ).
Key 163. Grades or classes and departments.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 1614., Curriculum and courses of study,
(a) State ex re 1. Langer. Attorney Genera 1
^  a_l. V. Totten et ( 1919) 175 N. W. ( N. D.
557)
FACTS ; This is an original application to the Su­
preme Court to compel the board of administration and the
educational commission to refrain from preparing and pre­
scribing the courses of study for the common schools of the 
state.
RULE: (1) The Legislature, under Const, sections
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li|.7» 151* except as restricted by constitutional limitations, 
possesses the power to regulate the educational system and 
public schools of the state, and to prescribe the courses of 
study in such schools.
(2 ) The Board of Administration Act, known as S. B. 
No. 13k.t enacted by Legislature in 1919 and referred to and 
adopted by the people, so far as granting to the board of 
administration specific power to control preparation of 
courses of study in common schools is not unconstitutional 
as interfering with and taking away prerogatives possessed 
by superintendent of public instruction as a constitutional 
officer under Const, sections 82, 8 3.
(3) The superintendent of public instruction has no 
constitutional or inherent power to prescribe and prepare 
the c ourses of study for the common schools of the state; 
such right having been granted to the Legislature by Const, 
section 8 3.
(14.) Under Board of Administration Act, enacted in 
1919» pursuant to Senate Bill No, 13l|., specifically granting 
to such board the supervision of preparation of courses of 
study for public schools, and by section 9 making powers of 
superintendent of public instruction subject to supervision 
only so far as such powers were subject to supervision of 
state board of education and boards to which Board of Admin­
istration succeeded, such superintendent has power to
#
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prescribe courses of study in common schools subject to 
supervision by Board of Administration.
Key 165. Religious instruction and reading of 
Scriptures.
(a) Gerhardt v. Heid.
For brief, see ante Key 2, Case (a).
Further ruling in this case, pertinent to this Key 
section, as follows :
Conduct of sectarian religious exercises and giving 
of sectarian instruction in public schools is prohibited by 
Constitution, (Const, sections i|., 147, 152.)
Key 166. Textbooks.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 167, Selection or adoption and change.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 168. Duty to furnish.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 169. Control of pupils and discipline in general.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 170. Rules and regulations.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 171. Authority to make.
Key 172. Reasonableness and validity.
(a) Stromberg v. French et a 1. ( 1931)
236 N. W. 477 (60 N. D. 7 5 0)
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FACTS ; This action was brought to restrain the de­
fendants from enforcing the following rule adopted by the 
board of education of the city of Langdon, to wit: "Notice
is hereby given that on and after September 29, 1930, any 
boy wearing metal heel plates on his shoes will be refused 
admittance to classes and will be suspended or expelled 
until the heel plates are removed." The boys in the school 
complied with this request. Murray Stromberg was one of the 
boys who used heel plates. His mother noticed that he had 
removed the plates and directed him to replace them. He 
complied with his mother’s direction and the school authori­
ties, objecting, sent him home until such time as he should 
remove them. Plaintiff was informed of this action of the 
principal and superintendent and at once interviewed them.
He insisted that as a parent he had the right to determine 
what apparel his boy should wear at school. So this action 
evo Ived.
RULE : Special school district board of education may
forbid pupils to wear metal heel plates (Comp. Laws 1913, 
section 1251).
Hey 172^. Construction and operation.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 173. Violation of rules and offenses.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 174' Punishment.
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No cases In North Dakota.
Key 175* In general.
No cases In North Dakota.
Key 176. Corporal punishment.
No cases in North Dakota.
Key 177. Expulsion or suspension.
(a) Stromberg v. French.
For brief, see ante Key 172, Case (a).
Further ruling pertinent to this Key section, as 
follows :
Pupil*s intentional refusal to observe board of edu­
cation’s rule because of parent's command constitutes "in­
subordination," within statute respecting suspension or ex­
pulsion (Comp. Laws 1913, section 1251).
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SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
The background of school law £s the story of educa­
tion.
Practically every important phase of public education 
has come before the court in one way or another, and it will 
be noted, from the nature of the cases, that common-sense 
principles emerging from experiences as a society underlie 
the legal structure which controls the schools. It is 
natural that questions relative to the meaning of legal pro­
visions affecting schools and people connected with schools 
are bound to arise. The reason for existing confusions is, 
of course, that no laws apply specifically to the question 
at hand, and differences arise as to their implied applica­
tions .
The State Constitution is the foundation of the edu­
cational system, with the legislature as the most important 
agency of the people in determining the educational policies 
of the state. Education therefore is a state function, and 
it is the responsibility of the state to enact laws Uhlch 
assure to all children equal and satisfactory educational 
opportunities. •
This summary is devoted to a general discussion of 
the more important issues of school law which have been
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considered by the Supreme Court in North Dakota. To present 
the results of every case would be merely repetitious.
PRIVATE SCHOOLS AND ACADEMIES
This chapter contained but one case* Gerhardt v.
1Heid* in which sectarianism was the issue. The court held 
that teachers may wear religious garb in the public school 
without violating the law, if there is no attempt made to 
give sectarian or religious instruction.
ESTABLISHMENT, SCHOOL LANDS, FUNDS,
AND REGULATIONS IN GENERAL
A  review of the eleven cases reported reveals two 
principal issues: (1) In State ex rel. v. Board of Univer­
sity and School Lands v. McMi1lan^ the court established 
that the proceeds from the sale of what is commonly termed 
"school lands" constitutes a permanent trust fund which may 
be used only for educational purposes, and (2) that the 
right of the board to exercise its discretion in the invest­
ment of the money of the permanent school fund, which was 
challenged in Moses v. Baker,3 was affirmed by the court.
 ̂ 267 N. W. 127.
2 96 N. W. 310.
3 299 N. W. 3 1 5.
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CREATION, ALTERATION, EXISTENCE, AND 
DISSOLUTION OF DISTRICTS
Twenty-seven cases pertain to this chapter.
Laws enacted for the consolidation or division of 
school districts are based solely on legislative discretion 
or policy. There are no limitations on the legislature re­
garding laws for reorganization of school districts ( School 
District No. 9ii v. King) And the legislature, having com­
plete power over school districts, may provide for the divi­
sion of property and the apportionment of the debts when a 
portion of the territory or property of one district is 
transferred to the jurisdiction of another (Coler v, Dwlght 
School Township).^
An incorporated village constituting part of three 
common school districts may be organized as a special school 
district (Bi11ings Schoo1 Di str ict v, Loma Specia 1 Schoo1 
Pistr ict).^ and a school district composed of an incorpor­
ated city alone is empowered to include adjoining territory 
annexed to the city ( Weeks v. Hetland)
If the legislature confers on a special board.
^ 127 N. W. 5 1 5 .
^ 55 N. w, 5 8 7 .
^ 219 N. W. 336.
^ 202 N. W. 8 07.
*
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composed of county commissioners and the county superintend­
ent, the power to organize new school districts (Ta 1Imadge
Û
V, WaIker). then the action of the board in granting a 
petition and organizing a new district is legislative, not 
Judicial, in character, and the members of the board are 
not bound to take oath as to whether the new school district 
is desirable or necessary after having been satisfied that 
it was for the best interests of the territory affected 
( State V. Strauss) Further, the board of county commis­
sioners and the county superintendent, upon being petitioned 
to do so by at least two thirds of the school voters re­
siding within a proposed new school district, are authorized 
to organize such new district from another district or por­
tions of districts already organized. The power thus con­
ferred upon the board to organize a new common school dis­
trict i_s_ not made dependent upon the vote of the people of 
the proposed new district (Bloomington School Pistrict v , 
Larson). However, the special board must, in all cases 
involving redistricting, exercise its powers to conform with 
statute.^ ̂
Q 159 N. W. 71. 
^ 187 N. W. 9614.. 
207 N. W. 650. 
Ibid.
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GCVERNMENT, OFFICERS, AND DISTRICT MEETINGS
The significant issue in this chapter, which reports 
nineteen cases, is that officers must at all times exercise 
only powers granted by statutory law (legislative authority)
( Gi1lespie v. Common School District No. ;8, McClean 
County). and an action of directors does not bind a school 
district unless taken at a meeting held and conducted ac­
cording to provisions of statutes.
In adopting and enforcing rules and regulations for 
the conduct of schools, school boards must always gauge 
their procedures in light of the legislative policy that 
public schools shall be equally free and open, and accessi­
ble to all children over six and under twenty-one years of 
age, a prevailing rule ( Batty v. Board of Education of City 
of Wi lliston)
DISTRICT PROPERTY, CONTRACTS AND LIABILITIES
In this area twenty cases are presented, the majority 
of which are devoted to powers and authorities of school 
officers in administering the affairs of the school district.
216 N. W. 
Ibid.
269 N. W. J4.9 .
• _
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It should he noted that they must always proceed according 
to statute, as in Chapter V preceding.
Boards of directors of common school districts are 
charged with the duty of erecting schoolhouses when directed 
by the majority of voters in the district ( Henderson v. Long 
Creek School Pi strict No. 2),^^ and statutes concerning 
petitions to school boards to call an election regarding a 
school site and the building of a schoolhouse are mandatory 
before an election, but directory thereafter; that is, stat­
utes concerning petitions for elections must be strictly 
followed. In a proceeding brought prior to election to en­
force the requirements of such petitions the court will en­
force the requirements of the statute and no election can be 
held without meeting the requirements of the petition stat­
ute. However, should the same proceeding be brought after a 
free election has been held, the same court will not void 
the election on the basis that, no complaint having been 
made prior to the election, the requirements of petition are 
met and it will be presumed that the board or other agency, 
as the case may be, had performed their duty and exercised 
their discretion according to law (State v. Wyndmere School 
District of Richland County). However, a contract to
171 N. W. 825. 
215 N. W. 267.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
175
build a schoolhouse for an amount In excess of funds avail­
able is void if the school board had no authority to make 
it, and subsequent ratification could not make it binding 
upon the district (Capita 1 Bank of St. Paul v. School Dis- 
trict No. 53 of Barnes County). But contracts entered 
into by school districts, even if they were irregularly 
made, may become binding upon the district by subsequent 
ratification, if the contract had been within the power of 
the district when executed (St, Paul Foundry Co. v, Burnstad 
School 1)1 St. No. 11).^®
DISTRICT DEBTS, SECURITIES, AND TAXATION
The power of school districts to incur indebtedness 
is limited by the Constitution and statutes, and a contract 
which increases the indebtedness of the district beyond the 
limit is void (Anderson v. Internationa 1 School Dtstrlet No, 
School districts may exercise the power of taxation 
only under valid delegation by the legislature, and statute 
limits the taxes that may be expended by the county auditor 
for school purposes (Great Northern Railway Co. v. Duncan).^®
i4.8 N. W. 363. 
269 N. W. 738.
19 156 N. W. 54.
176 N. W. 992.
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A resident and taxpayer within a school district is 
entitled to bring suit on his own behalf and on the behalf 
of the public to prevent unlawful expenditures and waste of 
the district’s funds ( Weeks v. Met land) ^
CLAIMS AGAINST DISTRICTS, AND ACTIONS
This chapter contains three cases, the most signifi­
cant holding that Judgment against a school district may be 
collected only under statute providing for levying taxes to
pay the judgment ( Auran v. Mentor School District No. _1 of
22Divide County). The holding is significant because the 
law does not contemplate an involuntary appropriation of 
funds necessary in the operation and maintenance of a public 
institution. To do so would work irrevocable harm against 
such institution. In the alternative, and applicable to 
school districts, the legislature has provided a system of 
additional taxation to replace the judicial remedies of 
garnishment
TEACHERS
This chapter contains fourteen cases which generally 
point out that the teaching position is considered not to be
202 N, W. 807.
22 228 N. W. î .35.
23 Ibid.
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that of public officers, but of employees (Mootz v. Be 1- 
yea);^^ and possession of a teacher*s certificate is a 
necessary prerequisite to appointment or employment (Hosmer 
V. Sheldon School District) However, a teacher may be 
uncertified when a contract is made, and may be granted a 
certificate before actual teaching begins ; and if the certif­
icate is so granted, the transaction is valid (Schafer v,
piJohns); and the right of a teacher to recover compensation
for services rendered is dependent upon possession of the 
proper certificate or license, where required by statute 
( Sandry v, Brooklyn School District)
In an action to dismiss a teacher, where a mode of 
procedure is prescribed, the latter must be followed in 
order for the dismissal to be valid (see citation 23 above). 
And where a teacher is dismissed without cause before the 
expiration of his term of employment, he is paid to date of 
dismis-sal, and if suit for breach of the teacher's contract 
resulting from dismissal was not tried until term of employ­
ment expired, amount recoverable by the teacher is the con­
tract price, less what he earned, or could have earned by
^  236 N. W. 358. 
25 59 N. W. 1035.
237 N. W. 1̂ 81. 
27 102 N. W. 689.
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reasonable diligence» subsequent to his discharge (Seher v . 
Woodlawn District No » 26. Kidder County)
PUPILS, CONDUCT AND DISCIPLINE OF SCHOOLS
Four of the twenty cases reported in this chapter
broadly summarize the issues involved.
A district school board must furnish adequate, con­
venient, and proper facilities for every child of school age 
in the district ( McWithy v . Heart River School District No, 
2^);^^ and any child of school age, living within the dis­
trict under the care, custody or control of a resident there­
of is a resident of that district ( Anderson v, Breitbarth).̂ ^
A pupil’s intentional refusal to observe a board of 
education rule because of a parent’s command constitutes 
"insubordination," within the statute respecting suspension 
or expulsion (Stromberg v . French)
Finally, the Constitution empowers the legislature to 
regulate the educational system and public schools of the 
state, and to prescribe the courses of study within the 
schools ( State v . Totten)
59 N. W. 2d 8 0 5. 
32 N. W. 2d 886.
N. W. 14.8 3. 
236 N. W. ij.77. 
175 N. w. 563.
Reproduced with permission o f the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited w ithout permission.
179
The recurring emphasis upon legislation to establish 
"adequate, proper, and convenient" facilities for all chil­
dren of school age was marked throughout this study. Fur­
ther, it is apparent that the regulation of schools and 
school districts is a state function, with certain powers 
delegated to the officers of school districts, and permis­
sive privileges, such as the right to petition and vote, 
being granted to the electors of districts. The control of 
moneys and property is cause for most litigation; but such 
litigation is generally the outgrowth of local misconcep­
tions and misinterpretations of the law which eventually 
must be clarified by decision of the court.
The cases ^ich have been represented in Chapter II 
through Chapter X of this summary were studied to determine 
the number and types of cases and the pervading principles 
of school law which were most frequently employed in the 
court decisions.
A number of conclusions may be made in wake of the 
cases and the summary which precede. In some instances, the 
motives and compulsions of the litigants are clear; in other 
instances, the causes of litigation are either privy to the 
individual or individuals involved. Certainly, in many 
cases the litigants, especially the district citizens who 
are confronted with the possibility of redistricting and 
consolidation, feel that their private rights have been
«
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invaded* and that, perhaps, the law is interfering with 
their freedom to make decisions involving problems which arc 
privy and singular to the district.
Also, tenacious claim to property, whether it be per­
sonal or belonging to the district, insinuates Itself into 
11ti gâtions.
In North Dakota there is a prevailing opinion that no 
body or individual outside the district is as Intimately 
familiar with the problems of that particular community as 
is the school board and the people whom it represents. The 
rural community feels its rights have been established by a 
pattern of long-established processes. Indeed, the people 
do not hesitate to take their school matters to court be­
cause they arc certain that their claims are substantiated 
by long-adhercd-to practice, the law notwithstanding. They 
arc defiantly confident that their rights will be upheld.
Rural communities cling to the country school because 
( 1) it is still the center of the farm community, (2) the 
people fee 1 they are adjusted to such problems as, for exam­
ple, their particular tax problem, and (3) the citizens fee 1 
that they still have some local control over the education 
of their children.
Repeatedly, in this summation, reference has been 
made to the redistricting and consolidation problem, which 
exists because citizens in towns and villages, for example.
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realize that, in a sense, survival of their ccanmunity de­
pends upon the maintenance of their school. The school, 
they feel, keeps the community "together."
It is not the purpose of this thesis to argue pros 
and cons of these problems. However, there are factors 
which will inevitably serve to alleviate the difficulties 
and mi sunderstandings which have been arising relative to 
redistricting and consolidation: (1) country roads are
being improved; (2) centers of trade are shifting from the 
rural village to the larger centers of activity; (3) In the 
rural communities there has been an infiltration of informa­
tion regarding problems of education, and Parent-Teacher 
Associations are being more widely organized. As a result 
of these factors, plus the fact that school tax levies In 
the rural school districts have become prohibitively exces­
sive, litigations should be considerably reduced in number 
and complexity, and rural areas will cease to struggle for 
survival of the local "country school" district where ques­
tions of redistricting and consolidation arise.
An examination, then, of the problems giving rise to 
the greatest number of cases, relative to school law, which 
have been brought before the North Dakota Supreme Court, 
namely, cases concerned with redistricting and consolidation^ 
reveals that the motives behind such litigations are based 
upon the desire of the district ^  maintain loca 1 contro 1.
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plus the fact, of course, that moneys and properties are 
irtvolved.
Finally, it may be observed that the enactments of 
the state legislature are supreme in school legislation 
unless the constitutionality of a law passed by that body 
is challenged; then the issue is placed before the Supreme 
Court of the State of North Dakota.
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